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I.

INTRODUCTION***

The Right to Access the Sea has been a long-standing
demand for land-locked States (LLS). The number of States lacking
such access is not small either, as 31 recognized States across the
world lack sovereign access to a coast.1 Historically, unfettered
access to the sea has been an important factor underpinning
economic prosperity and strategic heft of a society. The seafaring
societies of Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries were able to
establish vast empires for themselves.2 In the post-colonial world,
access to the sea has been critical in establishing the trading and
manufacturing prowess of the United States.3 The Cold War
demonstrated this several times in the form of the Soviet fixation
on access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean4 – something that
* Dhananjay Sahai is an attorney practicing in New Delhi. He holds a LL.B.
from Campus Law Center, University of Delhi, and a Bachelors with Hons in
History from Hansraj College, University of Delhi, India. Dhananjay also
researches on security and international relations.
** Prashant Khurana is an attorney based out of New Delhi, India. He holds
an LL.M. from the University of California – Los Angeles, a LL.B. from Campus
Law Center, University of Delhi, and a Bachelor with Hons in History from
Hansraj College, University of Delhi, India. Prashant is actively involved in
academic research on challenges related to textual interpretation.
*** The Authors would like to convey their heartfelt gratitude to the Hugh
& Hazel Darling Law Library, and in particular Ms. Rebecca Fordon (Lecturer
in Law and Faculty Services Librarian, University of California-Los Angeles
School of Law) for their enormous help and guidance in conducting research for
this paper.
1. Land-locked States, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INT’L L. (3d. ed. 2009)
[hereinafter OXFORD DICTIONARY].
2. See generally H. Th. De Booy, The Life Lines of the British Empire, 10
PAC. AFF. 161 (1967).
3. See generally Ronald P. Wilder & David R. Pender, Economic Behaviour
of Public Ports in the United States, 13 J. TRANSP. ECON. POL’Y. 169, 170 (1979)
(detailing the foreign trade tonnage and rank of U.S. Ports as of 1974).
4. See Alexandra Kuimova & Siemon T. Wezeman, Russia and Black Sea
Security, STOCKHOLM INT’L. PEACE RES. INST. (2018), www.sipri.org/publication
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Russia followed up with Ukraine in the recent past.5 China’s
economic rise has been partially attributed to the harbors of
Shanghai and Guangzhou. Put simply, access to the sea is not just
an imperative for global trade, it is also the hallmark of a country’s
ability to project its economic, political, and strategic heft. This
natural advantage is what LLS lack irreparably. Therefore, they
end up having to rely on the force of bilateral and multilateral
arrangements to ensure passage through territories of their
seafaring neighbors, also known as transit States. These
agreements, however, have not been perfect enunciations of
contractual or legal obligations and the loopholes therein have
imposed prohibitive economic and social costs on LLS.
This Article attempts to draw upon the existing international
legal regime in this area, to arrive at a defined international law
position for the Right to Access the Sea. The authoritative position
in statutory international law on this subject flow from Article 125
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which
provides a limited right of access for LLS.6 The right has evolved
through a series of historical enunciations in several conventions.
The historical process of this evolution is discussed in Part I. The
right is limited through a “sovereignty exception” which provides
the transit States with protection against the LLSs access right
from intruding into their “legitimate interests.”7 This has been
substantiated by the authoritative weight of scholars who hold that
a general right to access to the sea, apart from conventional
obligations, is “difficult to sustain.”8
Based on this, we concur that there is demonstrable precedent
in international law – derived through state practice and coordinate
legal obligations – to hold that an established albeit limited, right
to access the sea exists, and has existed in favor of LLSs. However,
we shall attempt to discuss the exact scope of that right through
this study. In Part II, we discuss the various ways in which States
have implemented this right and evaluate them against the
touchstone of an ideal implementation by defining a three-part
Effective Enforcement Test.
Part III presents the core of the study where we discuss cases
s/2018/sipri-background-papers/russia-and-black-sea-security [perma.cc/37BZ8JK6] (explains the history of the dispute over the Mediterranean Sea in the
context of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea); Neil J. Melvin, Rebuilding
Collective Security in the Black Sea Region, STOCKHOLM INT’L. PEACE RES. INST.
5-16
(2018),
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/sipripp50_0.pdf
[perma.cc/U8R9-ASFZ].
5. Cory Welt, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45008, UKRAINE: BACKGROUND,
CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA, AND U.S. POLICY 14 (2020).
6. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 125(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
7. Id.
8. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (6th ed.
2003).
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which do not optimally meet the Effective Enforcement Test. We
argue that international law envisages only a narrow sovereignty
exception which must meet the strict scrutiny of a compelling and
overriding interest of the Transit State to be applicable in curtailing
this right. Contrary to this interpretation, some States have used
the Sovereignty Rider (contained in Article 125(2) of the
Convention), and the Modalities Clause (contained in Article 125(3)
of the Convention) to cause undue delay and deny the proper
enjoyment of the right of access to LLS. Clearly, such an
implementation is contrary to the effective enforcement of the right
and falls short of our Effective Enforcement Test. We argue that
such use of the Convention’s modalities clause and the sovereignty
rider conflicts with the standard principles of interpretation and is
therefore a violation of the obligations of transit States under
International Law.
In Part IV, as a remedy for such violations, we suggest that the
United Nations has the power – incidental to its duties under the
U.N. Charter – to create space for accountability and actively
facilitate negotiations between LLSs and recalcitrant transit
States, thereby levelling the playing field to ensure the proper
implementation of the Convention’s aims and the functions
assigned to the U.N. under its Charter.
Part V addresses a very specific, narrow set of circumstances
relating to the right of access. We refer to these as “emergency
provisions.” Our argument here is that there can be certain
situations where the sovereignty exception can be narrowed even
beyond the textual scope of the Convention because of the
overriding effect of the Law of Necessity. In such rare
circumstances, it becomes permissible for LLSs to gain access to the
sea without any explicit or implicit authorization by the transit
State(s). In Part VI, this Article concludes with a strategic case for
why it makes strategic sense for India to champion this right in the
context of the geopolitical landscape in the Indian subcontinent.

II. PART I: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO
ACCESS THE SEA
The Right to Access the Sea is a culmination of several decades
of developments in a series of bilateral and multilateral
agreements. While the text of each of these agreements is not
important for the purposes of this study, a brief introduction to
them can prove to be informative in chalking out how the right has
evolved over the years.
1. The Flag State Declaration
Before World War I, there had been some confusion over
whether a State administering territory without access to the sea
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could have its flag used for the purpose of ships plying at sea. The
practice requiring all shipping vessels to be registered at a port and
carry the flag of the state administering the port began sometime
in the 17th century with an ordinance passed by the English Rump
Parliament under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell.9
The Barcelona Declaration in April 192110 clarified this
position by providing recognition to ships registered in LLSs and
recognized the place of registration as a legal fiction of a port of
registration.11 It is interesting to note here that the language used
in the title and content of the Barcelona Declaration seems to only
recognize the existence of a flag of a landlocked country: thus, its
name – “Flag State Declaration.”12 The Declaration does nothing to
recognize an inherent right of these countries to have access to
means to make this right practicable – something presumably left
for the determination of other bilateral and multilateral
arrangements.
2. Barcelona Convention and Statute of Freedom of Transit,
1921
The end of the First World War led to the creation of many new
LLS due to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.13
As a result, Europe saw an increase in transit treaties as these
newly formed LLS were keen to secure their economic interests by
accessing the sea. The Covenant of the League of Nations itself
recognized “freedom of communications and of transit and equitable
treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League.”14 On the
initiative of the League of Nations, the Barcelona Convention was
brought into effect in 1922.15
The Convention contains provisions for LLS freedom of transit
through waterways and railway.16 The treaty did not cover the
aspect of air or other forms of overland travel.17 The Convention is
based on the general recognition of a freedom of transit in favor of
LLS; however, it does not establish any clear right in their favor.18
9. An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation
1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18, § 1 (Eng.).
10. Declaration Recognizing the Right to a Flag of States Having No SeaCoast, Apr. 20, 1921, 7 U.N.T.S. 73 [hereinafter Flag State Convention].
11. Louis de Gouyon Matignon, The 1921 Flag Right Declaration, SPACE
LEGAL ISSUES (Jun. 10, 2019), www.spacelegalissues.com/the-1921-flag-right-d
eclaration/ [perma.cc/WL3L-VQ8F].
12. Flag State Convention, supra note 10.
13. Matignon, supra note 11.
14. League of Nations Covenant art. 23(e).
15. Milenko Milic, Access of Land-Locked States to and From the Sea, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 501, 507 (1981).
16. Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit art. 2, Apr. 20,
1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Barcelona Convention].
17. Id.
18. Ijaz Hussain, Pakistan’s Attitude Towards the Question of Free Access to
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It even contains various provisions where this freedom could be
suspended.19 Article 5, for instance, allows a State to prevent in its
territory the entry of such goods and persons as it sees as a threat
to the State's security.20
While this Treaty fell short of recognizing a right of transit for
land-locked States, it did form the basis of several future
Conventions and bilateral and multilateral treaties that recognized
such rights and freedoms.21
After the Barcelona Convention in 1922 and the Second World
War, several international and multilateral instruments dealt with
the issue of free access to the sea for land-locked countries. These
include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article
V,22 Havana Charter23, and some recommendations made by the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.24 While these are
often cited by land-locked countries as demonstrative of sufficient
state practice and awareness on the issue, Dr. Ijaz Hussain, a
Professor in Pakistan, argues that it was their insufficient ability to
rake up the issue that led to the International Law Commission
(ILC) deciding against the inclusion of the principle as it framed the
first draft of the UNCLOS – partly attributable to their lack of
“clout.”25 Subsequently, as the draft UNCLOS moved from the ILC
to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), resolutions
102826 and 110527 were adopted to consider and study the issue of
transit trade for landlocked states.28
3. The Fifth Committee
Over the years, the LLS led by countries like Afghanistan,
Bolivia, and Czechoslovakia had been pressing for greater
recognition of their Rights.29 This prompted the UN General

the Sea of Landlocked States, 22 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 475, 477 (1984).
19. Barcelona Convention, supra note 16 (discussing levies in Article 4,
security threats in Article 5, and emergency situations in Articles 7 and 12).
20. KISHOR UPRETY, THE TRANSIT REGIME FOR LANDLOCKED STATES:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 49 (2006).
21. Id. at 49.
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 5, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S 194 [hereinafter, GATT].
23 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, art. 33 (1948).
24. Uprety, supra note 20, at 478.
25. Hussain, supra note 18, at 491.
26. G.A. Res. 1028, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, (1957). G.A. Res.
1028 (XI) (Feb. 20, 1957).
27 G.A. Res. 1105, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, (1957). G.A. Res.
1105 (XI) (Feb. 21, 1957).
28. Hussain, supra note 18, at 475-79.
29. Kishor Uprety, Right of Access to the Sea of Land-Locked States:
Retrospect and Prospect for Development, 1 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 21, 60 (1995).
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Assembly to recommend a conference to address the issue. 30 As a
result, the Geneva Conference of 1958, or the First UN Conference
on the Laws of the Seas opened.31 The Geneva Conference
recommended the establishment of the Fifth Committee to look into
the question of land-locked States' access to the sea.32
While the Fifth Committee did not itself recommend a draft, it
suggested that the first UNCLOS should include provisions that
granted access to the sea for land-locked States.33 This includes not
just free access to the coast, but also a recognition of the free access
to the high seas, the right to fly a flag, and innocent passage across
territorial water.34 These suggestions did find a place in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the
Geneva Convention of the High Seas.35
4. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas
The Geneva Convention of the High Seas was one of the four
Conventions that emerged out of the First U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Seas.36 It was signed in 1958, but brought into effect in
1962.37 Article 3 of this Convention discussed the prospect of access
to the sea for land-locked States, based on reciprocity and subject to
“common agreement” with the transit States.38 It did not speak of a
right of access, but only stated that LLS “should have” access to the
Sea.39 Therefore, Kishor Uprety, Senior Counsel at The World
Bank, says that this Convention "to satisfy the demands of LLS for
a general law of free access and, as a pactum de contrahendo, made
transit rights dependent on the goodwill of coastal States.”40
5. The U.N. Convention on Law of the Seas – Textual
Analysis
The most comprehensive enunciation of the right to access the
sea in modern statutory law is provided in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Part X.41

30. Id.
31. Id. at 60-61.
32. Id.
33. Milic, supra note 15, at 503.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Tullio Treves, 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. www.legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html
[perma.cc/G6JE-AFDU] (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
37. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Sep. 30, 1962).
38. Id. at art. 3.
39. Id.
40. Uprety, supra note 20, at 4.
41. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 124-32.
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B. Article 124 of UNCLOS
Article 124(1)(a) provides the definition of a landlocked State
as a State controlling territory without a sea-coast.42 Article
124(1)(b) defines a Transit State as a state which is situated
between land-locked State and the seacoast “through whose
territory traffic in transit passes.”43 There are a few important
facets of note here. First, Article 124(1)(b) does not limit its
definition of a Transit State only to States which have a sea-coast,
therefore, a land-locked State can also be a transit state in the event
that it is so situated that “traffic in transit” passes through it.44
Second, nothing contained in Part X places any limitation or
qualification upon the route taken by the traffic from the LLS.45
Clearly, this means that a land-locked state is under no obligation
to use a shorter route, even when available.
Article 124(1)(c) and (d) provide a definition of “traffic in
transit” and “means of transport” respectively.46 These are defined
to include traditional merchandise shipments and due to the time
of enactment, make no mention of modern day, intangible
commodities like data and internet traffic.47

C. Article 125 of UNCLOS and Freedoms of the Sea
Article 125 is the operative portion of the statutory scheme.48
It is a three-part article and provides the general rule first. It
provides LLSs with the right of access to and from the sea “for the
purposes of exercising the rights” provided in the Convention,
“through the territory of the transit State by all means of
transport.”49 Isolated from the sovereignty exception, this is a very
comprehensive enunciation of the Right to Access the Sea. It has
the effect of extending the full force of the Freedoms of the Sea
provided in Article 87 of the Convention.50
As a concept, Freedoms of the Sea is a reference to the Mare
Liberum doctrine enunciated by Grotius in 1609.51 Mare Liberum
42. Id. at art. 124(1)(a).
43. Id. at art. 124(1)(b).
44. Id.
45. See UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 124-32 (being silent on this matter
with regards to Part X of UNCLOS, despite extensive references to the contours
of the right of access and defining obligations of LLS and transit States).
46. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 124(1)(c), (d).
47. Id.
48. See UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(1) [provides that LLS possess the
right to access the sea through transit States].
49. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(1).
50. Oxford Dictionary, supra note 1.
51. See HUGO GORTIUS, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard
Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund Inc. 2004) (1609).
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has its origins in the Anglo-Saxon law in the court of Elizabeth I,
and stands in opposition to Mare Causum (closed sea).52 The former
posits the existence of a seafaring regime that recognizes freedom
of navigation across the world barring enclaves,53 which are akin to
today’s internal waters under the UNCLOS.54 Mare Liberum
developed through centuries of practice and evolved because of
fishing rights given out by the English Crown.55 In the centuries
leading up to the reign of King James I, English kings had given out
so many fishing rights off the coast of England that the right had
virtually become universal.56 However, this was not the position
elsewhere, for instance in Scotland, a fact that James I attempted
to use when he began attempting a failed reversal of the
Elizabethan court’s embrace of Mare Liberum.57 Today, the
freedom to navigate and exploit the seas is an undeniable facet of
the international law of the sea. Article 87 of UNCLOS merely gives
statutory recognition to a long existing right.58 It is known to
include, inter alia, (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of
overflight; (c) freedom to law submarine cables and pipelines
(subject to Part VI of UNCLOS); (d) freedom to construct artificial
islands and other installations (subject to Part VI of UNCLOS and
other international law); (e) freedom of fishing (subject to
conservation requirements); and, (f) freedom to conduct scientific
research.59 This list is not an exhaustive one and other norms of
international law may provide for further freedoms.60 Perhaps, this
is also a recognition of the imperfections inherent in the codification
of customary norms of international law; broadly drafted clauses
are often an attempt to allay the potential for errors of omission
during interpretation.61 Article 125(1) also provides that LLS have
a right to enjoy the “common heritage of mankind” in the form of

52. PERCY E. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 110 (1959).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 2, 3 (defining the breadth and
legal status of the territorial sea of a State as an enclave of sovereignty).
55. Corbett, supra note 52, at 112.
56. Id. at 112 -13.
57. Id. at 110-11.
58. Freedoms of the Sea, OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 1.
59. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 87.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 149 (1988) (“The Congress which
enacted [42 U.S.C.] §1983 over 100 years ago would have rejected [a
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies] as inconsistent with the remedial
purposes of its broad statute."); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229,
237 (1969) ("A narrow construction of §1982 would be inconsistent with the
broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by §1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866."); Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249,
268 (1977) ("The language of the 1972 Amendments [to the LHWCA] is broad
and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage.
Indeed such a construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation.").
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exploitation of sea resources.62 “Common heritage of mankind”
articulates that the resources of certain areas – such as the sea, in
this case – shall not be exploited by a few States whose technical
and commercial abilities may allow them to do so at a given time,
but rather on behalf of humankind as a whole.63 This term finds
reference in several other international conventions which have
been understood to enunciate a standard of resource exploitation
based on mutual comity and cooperation.64 Some have even argued
for the doctrine’s application to the cultural field.65 While there is
no clear enunciation of what the phrase seeks to convey as essential
precepts of international law, its essence reflected in the General
Assembly Resolution articulating the International Seabed
Convention.66 The resolution notes – in the context of the ocean floor
at high seas – that the area would not be subject to appropriation
by any one State or person;67 that right to the area or its resources
will have to be exercised in consonance with international law;68 the
use by any State should be solely for peaceful purposes.69

D. Additional Articles of UNCLOS Narrowing the
Sovereignty Limitation
Article 127 places a bar on taxation of LLS transit70 and Article
128 opens the door for free zones in the ports of the Transit States.71
Article 129 and 130 further demonstrate that the text intends the
right of LLS to access the sea to be broadly construed.72 They
require Transit States to not only ensure the construction and
improvement of appropriate infrastructure to facilitate transit,73

62. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 125(1).
63. Common Heritage (of mankind), OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 1.
64. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2749(XXV) A, Declaration of Principles Governing the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction at art. 1 (Dec. 17, 1970); Agreement governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 11, Dec. 5, 1979,
1363 U.N.T.S. 3; see also G.A. Res. 34/46,1979 The Moon Treaty ¶ 1 (Dec. 5,
1979)
65. See Edwin Egede, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the SubSaharan African Native Land Tenure System: A ‘Clash of Cultures’ in the
Interpretation of Concepts in International Law?, 58 J. AFR. 71 (2014); Craig
Forrest, Cultural Heritage as the Common Heritage of Humankind: A Critical
Re-Evaluation, 40 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S.AFR. 124 (2007); Anastasia Strati, Deep
Seabed Cultural Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind, 40 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 859 (1991).
66. G.A. Res. A/2749(XXV), supra note 64.
67. Id. at art. 3.
68. Id. at art. 4.
69. Id. at art. 5.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 127.
71. Id. at art. 128.
72. Id. at arts. 129-130.
73. Id. at art. 129.
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but to minimize delays and ensure removal of any other difficulties
from transit as well.74 In addition, by providing for the involvement
and cooperation of LLSs in the process,75 the Convention further
narrows the sovereignty limitation.

E. Outside the Confines of Part X of UNCLOS
UNCLOS, therefore, works to bring coastal states and LLS at
a point of legal parity, at least insofar as the rights of each on the
seas is concerned. Even outside the confines of Part X, an attempt
has been made to extend this parity wherever possible. For
instance, in Article 69 of the Geneva Convention, an equitable right
to access the living resources of the continental shelf – i.e., within
the exclusive economic zone – has been recognized.76 While the
modalities of such exploitation have been left to regional and subregional bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements,77 the exercise
and existence of an equitable right for LLS in this domain is
abundantly recognized in the Article.78 It is also important to note
that unlike Part X, Article 69 does not explicitly limit the right of
exploitation to the principle of sovereignty, even though the
exploitation of resources will take place in the Exclusive Economic
Zone.79 The consistent textual credence to ensure equity in the
rights and freedoms associated with the seas among coastal States
and LLS demonstrably indicates an intent to bridge geographical
disadvantage through a legal fiction, to the extent possible.80 It also
indicates an intent to depart from any existing non-essential
practice to the contrary.81 The substantive qualitative limitation on
the dependence predicating the application of the exception is
further indicative of the expansively intended breadth of the
statutory language. This equality provides the fundamental basis
74. Id. at art. 130.
75. Id. at art. 129.
76. Id. at art. 69(1). [Article 70 extends similar treatment to Geographically
Disadvantaged States (GDS), which is a distinct categorization and may also
include coastal States.] Id. at art. 70. However, that is not a relevant category
for the present discussion. For further discussion on the criteria for GDS, see
Lewis M. Alexander, The Disadvantaged States and the Law of the Sea, 5 MARIN
POL'Y 196 (1981).
77. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art.125(2).
78. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(1); see also infra Part III (for a
discussion on the misuse of article 125 by transit States).
79. Cf. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125 (providing from both certain
rights for some States, although the former provides an explicit caveat of
sovereignty).
80. The term “Coastal States” is narrower in scope than “Transit States” due
to the context of the right involved.
81. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 71 (driving home this point through the
phraseology of article 71, which creates an exception to article 69 but is limited
to cases where the coastal state is overwhelmingly dependent on the living
resources of the region).
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to our argument that barring the geographical reality of access,
there is no differentiation between coastal states and LLS states as
it pertains to the law of the sea. It can, therefore, be argued that the
textual intent is to keep the sovereignty exception contained in
Article 125(3) to the narrowest possible limit.82

F. The Three-Fold Approach to Determine
International Law
While the principle presented by a textual analysis such as the
one elucidated above can be quite convincing, a generalization can
be deceiving. R.J. Dupuy described the law of the sea as
“situationalist” because despite the universality of its application,
its implementation has been a diverse concoction predominantly
dictated by individual circumstances.83 This is true from a practical
perspective, since most transit relationships are instituted through
bilateral and regional agreements.84 However, international law is
one arena where practice is often impacted by extra-legal
considerations such as military and strategic capacity, offset
conditions, etc.85 Now, the recognized sources of international law
are primarily understood to be three-fold:
Statutory International Law enunciated in specific
agreements and applicable as to the countries that
voluntarily choose to contract into them;86
Customary International Law;87 and,
Renowned academic and judicial opinion.88
Flowing from the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the above three-fold approach to the determination of
international law has been analogized to legal philosopher H.L.A.
Hart’s “secondary rules.”89 Hart enunciated the concept of
secondary rules to explain the approach for the determination of
laws that actually influence and direct the behavior of parties,
82. See UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art.125(3).
83. D. CARREAU et. al., DROIT INT’L ECONOMIQUE 61 (1990).
84. See infra Part II.
85. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two
Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487 (1997) (highlighting the comprehensive manner
in which practical considerations cause a divergence between the normative and
positive view of international law and State practice).
86. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(a) Apr. 18, 1946.
87. Id. at art. 38(1)(b).
88. Id. at art. 38(1)(c).
89. Randall H. Cook, Dynamic Content: The Strategic Contingency of
International Law, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 94 (2004).
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referred to as “primary rules.”90 Within this three-fold approach,
“Customary International Law” is critical for our discussion. The
ICJ has defined the term to mean that body of law which can be
derived from consistent State practice and “opinio juris.”91 Opinio
Juris is a doctrine enunciated in several ICJ cases.92 It operates as
a further condition on consistent State practice and requires that to
be considered Customary International Law, such practice must
also be carried out under a belief that that it is in “confirming to
what amounts to a legal obligation.”93 Opinio Juris, therefore, is a
doctrine that hinges on the subjective satisfaction of a State that
the action performed by it is being done to fulfill a legal obligation
it owes. Such an obligation may or may not find space in Statutory
International Law by itself. However, if it is carried out consistently,
and with the element of opinio juris it becomes Customary
International Law.94
The above discussion is critical in the context of the rights of
LLS. This is because any enunciation of the right in UNCLOS, or
any other international agreement for that matter, will be severely
constricted in its implementation because of extra-legal factors. To
an outside observer, this gives the impression of a haphazard and
ad-hoc implementation of the right itself, perhaps explaining
Dupuy’s characterization of the Law of the Sea as “situationalist.”95
However, from a legal standpoint, the conduct of transit states
cannot eviscerate or dilute the obligation undertaken by them
under Article 125 of the UNCLOS. This is because such conduct
would not carry the necessary opinio juris to affect a customary
repeal of the statutory enunciation of the UNCLOS. It may,
however, inform the operation of the sovereignty exception
contained within Article 125.

III. PART II: EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO
ACCESS THE SEA
1. Effective Enforcement Test
The manner in which the sovereignty exception operates can
90. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961).
91. Cook, supra note 89, at 94.
92. See, e.g., Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (for a
discussion on the origins and definition of opinion juris), North Sea Continental
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 76-77 (Feb 1969), Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgement 1986 I.C.J. 109-109 (June 27), S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10 ¶ 76, 79 (Sept. 7).
93. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
94. CLIVE PARRY, The SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1965) (discussing the evolution of international criminal law).
95. CARREAU, supra note 83, at 61.
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be gleaned from the numerous agreements between transit States
and LLSs. An ideal transit agreement that adequately enforces the
Right of Access for Transit States should demonstrate the following
features:
Freedom of Movement – Generally, the agreement must
provide for a friction-less movement of goods through the
transit state, with minimal time and monetary cost
imposition. Regulatory procedures, if any, should be
tailored to meet narrowly defined aims and must not
impose an excessive burden on movement. Quantitative
or qualitative exceptions should be specific and must also
be narrowly tailored to meet specific pre-defined interests
of transit States, e.g., in the movement of hazardous
material.
Predictability and Certainty – This is critical to the actual
utilization of any benefits provided in an agreement.
Meaningful economic and social activity cannot exist in
the absence of a predictable and stable legal regime since
frequent changes increase risk, and therefore deter
investment. Dramatic changes – even when they are not
adverse to free movement – can also increase animosity
and sour public opinion. Over time, these can contribute
to a complete breakdown of support for the system. This
can be seen in the debate leading up to the Brexit vote.
The build-up of anti-immigration sentiment –
notwithstanding a qualitative judgement on that opinion
– created a cleavage between the interests of a significant
section in the UK and the rest of the EU, causing a
rupture.96 Therefore, any arrangement that establishes
freedom of movement must also have a self-contained
mechanism of negotiated, deliberate changes that all
parties commit to follow in earnest. Institutionalization of
changes in this manner allows each contracting party to
approach the negotiating table with clear, identifiable
interests in mind. It also opens space for a broad-based
involvement of stakeholders, reducing the potential for
arbitrary changes.
Institutionalized Remedies – The above two elements
must also be secured through a system of remedies,
ensuring that arbitrary decision making at any level
would be swiftly counteracted to restore status quo ante.
96. Toby Helm, British Euroscepticism: A Brief History, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 7,
2016, 12:04 AM), www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-eurosceptic
ism-a-brief-history [perma.cc/24JE-X3S3].

2021]

The Right to Access the Sea

961

Many international agreements are often rendered
unenforceable simply because the contracting parties
begin to act in pursuit of parochial self-interests. Where
significant strategic and economic disparities exist among
the parties, this phenomenon is even more pronounced.
Ultimately, such a situation results in a de facto
abandonment of the agreement and all associated rights
and obligations. A mechanism – whether political, judicial
or a hybrid of the two – acts as a strong deterrent to
parochial instincts and preserves the integrity of the
system.
2. Current Enforcement Practices
A survey of existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements
tested against the touchstone of the aforementioned metrics reveals
substantial variance in enforcement. Agreements range from those
which meet all three of the above criteria to situations where none
of them exist. The latter category tends to foster an ecosystem of
informal, ad-hoc actors that facilitate limited movement at
enormous costs. In the former category, perhaps the finest example
is the thirty-two member European Union Single Market.97

B. The European Union Single Market
The Single Market allows for virtually unhindered access of
goods and services across the borders of member States,98 and
therefore makes it easier for LLSs to access port facilities anywhere
on the continent. The regulatory compliance burden on individuals
is also comparatively minimal.99 Barring the exception of Brexit, the
Single Market has proven to be an exceptionally stable zone.100 The
international treaties establishing the Single Market are
entrenched in the municipal laws of each of the member States, and

97. The European Union Single Market includes the twenty-seven full
member States of the European Union, and the United Kingdom (during the
Brexit transition phase at the minimum). It also includes Norway,
Liechtenstein, and Iceland through a multilateral agreement, and Switzerland
through an independent bilateral agreement with the EU.
98. The Single Market also largely overlaps with the Schengen Area.
However, including Schengen as an example would be inaccurate since it
primarily deals with the movement of people and the right of access to the sea
in the UNCLOS context is limited to movement of goods.
99. The European Single Market, EUROPEAN COMM’N, www.ec.europa.eu/g
rowth/single-market_en [perma.cc/2PHF-L4SF] (last visited Sep. 9, 2020).
100. About the EU-Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, www.europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/countries_en [perma.cc/9SYM-PCYD] (last visited Sep. 9, 2020).
The EU and the Single Market have only expanded since their inception. Id.
Britain was the first country ever to demand a withdrawal. Id.
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it enjoys high political support in each of the member States.101
Paradoxically, the political slugfest surrounding the Brexit process
has not only increased support for the institution within member
countries, it has also worked to demonstrate its centrality and
permanence in the geopolitical landscape of Europe – an exemplar
of stability and predictability of the regime.102 Other examples of
regional pacts are the Association for Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) free trade area in South East Asia;103 the Andean
Community in South America;104 and the Southern African
Development Community in Africa.105 While modeled around the
Single Market, none of these agreements have yet been able to
reach the comprehensiveness or maturity of their European
counterpart.

C. The China-Mongolia-Russia Transit Agreement
Bypasses the Complexities of the Single Market
Another approach to regional transit agreements can be seen
in the relatively recent China-Mongolia-Russia Transit Agreement
(Asian Highway Network Agreement).106 Mongolia is a land locked
State bordered by Russia and China. This agreement opens up
specific roads to Mongolia for use as transit routes, while keeping
the rest of the transit countries outside its ambit.107 The agreement
also has the potential to be expanded because it includes the
accession by other neighboring countries. One of the roads opened
to Mongolia also leads into Pakistan as part of the Silk Road
101. See id. (noting that joining the EU requires ratification of all existing
EU laws and procedures – unless exempted specifically – and further requires
implementation of all EU regulations throughout the duration of membership);
see also Richard Wike et al., Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and
Prosperity, but Say Brussels Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens , PEW RES. CTR.
(Mar. 19, 2019), www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/19/europeans-credit-euwith-promoting-peace-and-prosperity-but-say-brussels-is-out-of-touch-with-itscitizens/ [perma.cc/AHG9-MQN8] (discussing public support levels for EU
which continue to remain relatively high despite BREXIT).
102. Douglas Webber, Why Brexit Has Not and Will Not Trigger EU
Disintegration, CONVERSATION (Jan. 31, 2020 6:07 AM), www.theconversation.c
om/why-brexit-has-not-and-will-not-trigger-eu-disintegration-130719
[perma.cc/2JBX-6WVU].
103. ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services signed and in effect: 1998.
ASEAN Trade in Goods signed and in effect: 2010. ASEAN Comprehensive
Investment Agreement: 2012.
104. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
910.
105. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 116.
106. China, Mongolia And Russian Federation To Open Up New Era Of
Trade Cooperation, UNESCAP (Dec. 8, 2016), www.unescap.org/news/chinamongolia-and-russian-federation-open-new-era-trade-cooperation
[perma.cc/QE5Z-KSL5].
107. Id.
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Initiative. Clearly, this agreement is limited in scope to road
transportation. However, it defers to internationally accepted
standards for hazardous goods108, regulation of types of vehicles to
be used,109 and contains provisions for reciprocal exemption from
customs for import of certain commodities necessary for transit.110
The agreement also establishes a supervisory council to ensure
smooth implementation and dispute resolution.111
The deference to international standards is quite significant
because it reduces the scope for arbitrary changes in municipal
regulation and eliminates the need for complex negotiations on
these definitions. Since the agreement does not seek to create a free
trade regime between China, Russia and Mongolia, and instead is
only focused on creating a transit regime; it can bypass the complex
structures needed to sustain a Single Market like that of the EU.
This narrower approach is easier to accomplish and can serve as an
ideal model for situations where political consensus on a Single
Market is not available. This is also reflected in the fact that other
agreements in the region have tended to follow this template to
varying extents. Central Asian and Eastern Europe have several
agreements extending transit rights to ensure port access.112 While

108. Intergovernmental Agreement on International Road Transport Along
the Asian Highway Network art. 7, Dec. 8, 2016, UNESCAP, www.unescap.org
/sites/default/files/Intergovernmental-Agreement-on-International-RoadTransport-along-the-Asian-Highway-Network-English-language.pdf
[perma.cc/43U6-6YRQ] [hereinafter ASN Agreement].
109. Id. at art. 6.
110. Id. at art. 8.
111. Id. at art. 12.
112. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Transit Movement By Road
Transport of Goods Through the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(March 26, 2004); Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China, Kyrgyz Republic and Islamic Republic
of Pakistan On Transit Transportations (March 9, 1995); Agreement Between
the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of China on
International Road Transport, (June 4, 1994); Agreement on International Road
Transport between the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (June 22, 1993); Agreement
between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on International Road Transport, (Dec. 25, 2003);
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the
Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on International Road Transport,
(June 14, 1995); Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Transit of Commodities
by Motor Transport through the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, (Mar.
26, 2004); Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and the
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on International Road Transport, (Mar. 1,
2004); Agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and the
Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on International Road Transport,
(Apr. 16, 2002); Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on International Road
Transport, (May 27, 2013); Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz
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each of these has some variation – including qualitative and
quantitative restrictions in some cases – they broadly follow the
template of the Asian Highway Network Agreement.113 A further
boost to these agreements has been the One Belt One Road Project
pursued by China which – if successful – could substantially
improve real world connectivity across Central Asia and yield
access to ports on their Eastern and Southern flanks, in Russia,
China, and Pakistan. It would also be a substantial diplomatic feat
for China.114
On the bilateral front, the Djibouti-Ethiopia Transit
Agreement is important to consider.115 The agreement provides for
a comprehensive 20-year framework with a clearly defined
regulatory scope, deemed renewal, and subsistence clauses in cases
of an early termination.116 It also contains provisions for dispute
resolution.117 These factors led the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) to include it as a model bilateral transit
agreement.118

Republic and the Government of Turkmenistan on International Transport of
Passengers and Goods by Road, 1995; Agreement between the Government of
Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on International
Road Transport, (Feb. 21, 1993); Agreement between the Government of the
Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on
International Road Transport, (Sept. 4, 1996); Afghanistan Azerbaijan Islamic
Republic of Iran Kazakhstan Pakistan Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan ECO Transit Transport Framework Agreement, (May 9, 1998);
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Tajikistan Turkey Uzbekistan Basic
Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the
Europe-the Caucasus-Asia Corridor, (Sep. 8, 1998); Armenia Azerbaijan
Georgia Kazakhstan Russian Federation Tajikistan Uzbekistan Agreement on
Weights and Dimensions of Vehicles Undertaking International Transport on
Roads of the CIS Member States, 1999.
113. See DATABASE OF AGREEMENTS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL ROAD
TRANSPORT, UNESCAP, www.tadb.unescap.org/ [perma.cc/6MYR-R5XV] (last
visited Jul. 3, 2020) (providing a full list of agreements among landlocked States
and transit States).
114. See Alexander Cooley, Russia And China in Central Asia, Norwegian
Inst. Int’l Aff. (2015) (discusses China’s imperatives and strategy behind
OBOR).
115. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
DJIBOUTI CITY – ADDIS ABABA TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT CORRIDOR,
UNCTAD/ALDC/2018/6 (2018), www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldc2
018d6_en.pdf [perma.cc/E5H4-NKUQ] (explains the transit agreement signed
between Djibouti and Ethiopia).
116. Yohannes Anberbir, Ethiopia: Djibouti Signs 20 Year Port Agreement
with Ethiopia, REP. ETH. (Dec. 16, 2006), www.allafrica.com/stories/2006121805
99.html [perma.cc/H86V-PYMB].
117. Id.
118. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Regional Cooperation in
Transit Transport: Solutions For Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries,
at 11, U.N. Doc TD/B/COM.3/EM/30/3 (Nov. 12, 2007), www.unctad.org/en/D
ocs/c3em30d2_en.pdf [perma.cc/U2C7-5KL6].
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IV. PART III: HIJACKING THE MODALITIES CLAUSE
While the analysis in Part II provides useful insight into the
implementation of transit agreements, there is little discernible
commonality – distillable from geopolitics – to help in a meaningful
heuristic analysis of the limits on the sovereignty exception. Such
lack of commonality strips away the necessary consistency required
in a Customary Law analysis of the sovereignty exception in Article
125 of UNCLOS. Furthermore, by their very nature, bilateral and
regional transit agreements depend heavily on geopolitical
negotiations. While perfectly reasonable from a foreign affairs
standpoint, it prevents the agreements from meeting the standard
of opinio juris as elaborated by the ICJ,119 and thus lack the
necessary force of Customary International Law (CIL). Therefore,
while the agreements were negotiated by the States under a belief
that they were fulfilling a legal obligation under UNCLOS, their
content provides little guidance on scope of the right to access the
sea that LLS possesses under the Convention.

A. Strong Presumption that UNCLOS Provides a
Secure Right to Access
It may also be argued that groping for a uniform
understanding of the scope of the right to access is a farcical exercise
in the first instance. There would be some force in this argument
because while it lays down a general principle, the Convention has
largely left it to States to decide the exact modalities of the
operation of that principle120 – thereby providing textual
recognition to a decentralized approach. However, we contend that
such a reading of the Convention presents an unreasonably narrow
interpretation of textual intent. As highlighted in Part II above,
several provisions within the Convention point to a deliberate
attempt to completely secure the right granted to LLS. These go
beyond the enunciation of a generic principle and actively place
obligations in matters that would otherwise be considered sovereign
decisions, e.g., Article 130 (obliging transit States – using the word
“shall” – to “take all appropriate measures to avoid delays”); and
Article 127 (prohibiting the imposition of customs and taxes on
Transit goods). Conventional doctrines of interpretation and
construction dictate that greater specificity posits an application
according to its terms – the “plain meaning rule.”121 The specificity
of these provisions raises a strong presumption of a textual intent
of establishing strong protections for the right of access. The
presumption can be further buttressed by observing Article 132
119. Parry, supra note 94.
120. UNCLOS supra note 6, art. 125(2).
121. E.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2013).
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which explicitly protects against preemption of greater transit
facilities.122 Such a clause would not be necessary if the right of
access in the Convention was intended to provide a general
principle. Given that the sovereignty exception would operate –
even without its inclusion in Article 125(3) – through the Geneva
Convention in all transit agreements, the existence of Article 132
cannot be explained as a protection for agreements in violation of
the sovereignty rider. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 132 can
only be explained by assuming some level of specificity of the right
to access enunciated in the Convention – this is the bare minimum
that is specified in International Law and Article 132 formalizes the
understanding that Part X of the Convention should be seen as a
floor. A bare minimum, by its very definition, cannot be an abstract
idea and, therefore, has a defined specificity for the purposes of
International law. However, that specificity – while in existence –
has evidently not yet received articulation, to the fullest extent.
Traditionally, this role would have been fulfilled by a decision
of the ICJ or a resolution of one of the political branches of the UN.
In its absence, States have used the interpretational elbow room to
create the widely disparate systems we analyzed above. In many
cases, these deny LLS the basic rights due to them under the
Convention by transit States, either generally or episodically.123
Effectively therefore, transit States have used the modalities clause
of Article 125 - which merely exists to formalize enforcement of the
right of access – to deny the existence of the right itself, by placing
arbitrary limitations on the enforcement of the right. This has been
accomplished by either creating impermissibly wide exceptions in
bilateral and multilateral agreements contracted in pursuance of
the modalities clause or by simply keeping the agreements in
abeyance.

122. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 132.
123. See, e.g., Around the World, Blockade by Pretoria Said to Strain
Lesotho,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
1986),
www.nytimes.com/1986/01/15/world/arond-the-world-blockade-by-pretoriasaid-to-strain-lesotho.html [perma.cc/3GYE-4YSE]; Barbara Crossette, Nepal's
Economy Is Gasping as India, a Huge Neighbor, Squeezes It Hard, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 1989), www.nytimes.com/1989/04/11/world/nepal-s-economy-isgasping-as-india-a-huge-neighbor-squeezes-it-hard.html
[perma.cc/J6NX6AUF]; Dipanjan Roy Choudhary, India Apprises Western Powers of Pakistan
Blockade of Afghan Transit Route, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016),
www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-appriseswestern-powers-of-pakistan-blockade-of-afghan-transitroute/articleshow/54740741.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium
=text&utm_campaign=cppst [perma.cc/2NUG-XZBD]; Thomas Snow et. al.,
Country Case Studies on the Challenges Facing Landlocked Developing
Countries, U.N. Dev. Program Hum. (2003).
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B. Sovereignty Exception under Article 125(3) Presumes
the Existence for the Right of Access
We argue that this is in contravention with existing
international law because the sovereignty exception under Article
125(3) needs to be understood narrowly and harmoniously with the
rights of LLS. The existing practice of using sovereignty to justify
restrictive covenants or simply denying the right absent such an
agreement goes against the letter and spirit of the Convention. A
bare perusal of the textual provision itself demonstrates this. The
modalities clause reads, “The terms and modalities for exercising
freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-locked States
and transit States concerned through bilateral, subregional or
regional agreements.”124
The clause does not subject the right of access itself to
agreements between parties. Instead, it presumes the existence of
that right – which has been provided in the preceding clause – and
only subjects an enforcement mechanism to be determined by the
States themselves. That this distinction between execution and
existence of a right was well known at the time the Convention was
drafted can be borne out from the legislative history.
a. Legislative History
During the Second Session of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the representative of Cuba – discussing the
scope of Part X – noted that the “general principle [of the right of
access] should be confirmed in the Convention.”125 The
representative further noted that bilateral agreements with the
transit countries should regulate the “application of the principle in
individual cases.”126 During the same session, the representatives
from Zambia noted the importance of alternative routes and the
ability of LLS to have “their option[s] open.”127 It is evident that
such a statement presumes the existence of a distinction between
the right inherited and its execution, since a right predicated on
bilateral agreements would not require a clarification on
alternative routes given that States are allowed to enter into
agreements as they please. Several other statements also point to a
common understanding that Part X enunciates such a distinction.
The representative of Laos noted that the right was “an element of

124. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(2).
125. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PART X, ARTICLES 124 TO
132 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 40 ¶ 60
(1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41, ¶ 65.
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the sovereign equality of States.”128 Afghanistan noted that
subjecting the rights of LLS to bilateral or multilateral agreements
would be “restrictive and discriminatory.”129 Algeria also noted that
the Conference’s task was to provide “universal recognition” of the
right of access and “specif[ied] the modalities of its
implementation,”130 in a further nod to the prevalence of this
distinction.
b. Further Evidence from the Pakistani Representative
Further evidence that the issue of a right-execution separation
was at the core of discussions during the conference can be gleaned
from a statement by the representative of Pakistan. During the
Second Session, the representative of Pakistan said in the context
of Part X,
[A]s a developing country, Pakistan appreciated the aspirations of
developing land-locked States to improve the life of their peoples and
it had always extended full transit facilities to its neighboring landlocked States, under bilateral agreements. It saw no justification
for making the existence of transit facilities independent of
agreement between the parties concerned . . .131

This statement is intriguing for two reasons. First, given the
context that Pakistan has often contested Afghanistan’s access to
the sea,132 it is noteworthy that it chose to contest it by using the
phrase “existence of transit facilities,” instead of some formulation
such as “existence of a right to access the sea.” The use of “transit
facilities” is a clear nod to the idea that modalities of transit are
distinct from the inherent right of transit. Second, even if this is not
the case and Pakistan’s statement is interpreted as a demand for
conditioning the right on agreements, a plain reading of the text of
Article 125 demonstrates that this view was rejected by the final
text of the Convention. As noted above, the article pointedly first
recognizes a general right,133 and then only subjects the “modalities
for exercising” that right to agreements.134 The very existence of the
Modalities Clause, therefore, betrays the fact that any demand by
countries to subject the general right to agreements was not
incorporated into the final text of the Convention and does not
constitute International Law. In practice therefore, the Modalities
Clause – and consequently the sovereignty rider – have been used
128. Id. at 41, ¶ 64.
129. Id. at 42, ¶ 66.
130. Id. at 44, ¶ 76.
131. Id. at 43, ¶ 71 (emphasis added).
132. Pakistan and Afghanistan, INST. FOR STUDY WAR, www.understand
ingwar.org/pakistan-and-afghanistan [perma.cc/6FJX-S5LG] (last visited July
4, 2020).
133. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(1).
134. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(3).
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to cause undue delay or obstruction in the ability of LLS to exercise
their right of transit.
c.

The Modality Clause Must Be Interpreted to Preserve
Its Effect, Not Nullify It

That such use of the Modalities Clause is unreasonably
expensive is also borne out by the application of principles of
statutory interpretation emphasized by the Vienna Convention.
The basic rule here is object and purpose, aka, teleological
interpretation.135 In Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, the ICJ emphasized that teleological
interpretations are governed by the maxim “ut res magis valet quam
pereat.”136 In the legal sense, this means that of two possible
constructions, the statute must be interpreted in a way that
preserves an effect, rather than nullifying it.137 Breaking down this
principle, two principal aspects of the interpretational logic can be
understood.138 One, that a treaty must necessarily be interpreted
such that all its provisions are taken into account when making an
interpretation – i.e., a statute has no redundant text. This is
governed by the maxim that all provisions of a text are intended to
achieve a common goal. Two, in a choice between multiple
interpretations, one which best serves the purpose of the text in
totality must be operative.139
Harking back to the textual analysis we considered above and
applying the two governing principles to the UNCLOS, we see that
the sovereignty rider and the modalities clause must necessarily be
interpreted in a manner that retains the guarantee offered in
Article 125(1)140 – the right of access. Furthermore, as was noted
earlier in Part I, there is a clear intent on part of the framers to

135. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31. May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
136. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
(Second Phase), Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 64, 229 (July 18)
(hereinafter Peace Treaties).
137. Construction, BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed, 2019) (The relevant
portion reads, [“Latin ’a construction that gives effect to the matter rather than
having it fail‘] (18c) A construction arrived at when alternative readings are
possible, one of which (usu. the broader reading) would achieve the manifest
purpose of the document and one of which (usu. the narrower reading) would
reduce it to futility or absurdity, whereby the interpreter chooses the one that
gives effect to the document's purpose.”).
138. Viljam Engstrom, Implied Powers of International Organizations: On
the Character of a Legal Doctrine, 14 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 129, 138 (2003).
139. C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAN OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 45 (2d ed. 1996) (providing a wholesome
explanation of how Article 31 of the VCLT, 1969, must be read when
interpreting treaties).
140. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125(1).
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guarantee parity to LLS in the affairs of the Sea.141 The bevy of
provisions in the Convention detailed above and the painstaking
efforts to ensure the incorporation of concepts such as “common
heritage of mankind” are demonstrative of the legislative intent to
cement this parity. A harmonious reading of the three subsections
of Article 125 of the Convention, therefore, requires that Transit
States act in good faith and implement their obligation of
implementing the right of access without undue delay, and in a
reasonably competent and reliable manner to ensure the fullest
possible enjoyment of that right by LLS. Given that sea-based trade
routes dominate global trade and are critical for economic
development, such use of oceans constitutes the “common heritage
of mankind”. A right of transit that cannot guarantee reliable, and
consistent access to the sea is functionally meaningless from this
perspective and hinders the LLS’ ability to enjoy the common
heritage.
Consequently, a correct interpretation of the Convention
requires that its functional intent be respected. Therefore, the
implementation must meet the Standards of Effective Enforcement
outlined in Part II. An implementation which is consistent with
such enforcement can be achieved only on a limited reading of the
sovereignty exception, i.e., to prevent a LLS from exercising its
right of transit, the Transit State must demonstrate a compelling
and overriding State interest. This is what leads us to interpret the
Sovereignty Rider and the Modalities Clause in a narrow manner.
This demonstrates that States which have hitherto acted in
bad faith to unduly delay negotiations of transit agreements; or
have subjected such agreements to broad, arbitrary exceptions and
used said exceptions to deny free transit without good cause; are in
violation of their obligations under prevailing International Law
and are infringing on the rights of land-locked States. Such States
have unilaterally expended the Modalities clause beyond its textual
remit and are abusing the same to unduly deny the rights of other
sovereign States.

V. PART IV: THE UNITED NATIONS AS A REMEDY FOR
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNCLOS
For land-locked States the redressal of this abuse lies not only
in the four corners of the Convention. We argue that it is possible
for the United Nations to step in and create a mechanism for
actively facilitating negotiations under the Modalities Clause and
to monitor that the agreements made therein correspond to a
correct reading of the Convention. This argument can be articulated
through the following three-fold reasoning:
141. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 69, 71, 87, 124-132.
(parenthetical).
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Statutory International Law imposes an obligation on States
to pursue cooperation in the interest of legitimate
economic development goals of other countries. The
United Nations is vested with the responsibility of
ensuring such cooperation and has a broad range of
powers in this regard;
Countries that lack access to the sea are significantly more
economically disadvantaged, compared with the rest. As
such, the UN is empowered and functionally responsible
to redress the economic disadvantage arising out of lack
of effective enforcement of the right to access the sea; and,
The UN therefore possesses an implied power to create
mechanisms that can facilitate negotiations under the
Modalities Clause. In so doing, the UN would be helping
LLS to seek their right of access. Member States of the
UN that are Transit States will be legally obligated to
participate under such a process.
Let’s analyze each of the above individually.
1. Part IVA Obligation for Economic Cooperation under
International Law
The history of international cooperation for the purposes of
economic prosperity and social progress is well documented. In the
post war era, the principle found its most emphatic articulation in
the Charter of the Nations. The Preamble refers to an aim of
promoting “social progress and better standards in life for larger
freedom”;142 and notes that the international system of cooperation
ought to be used for “the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples.”143 The advancement of economic
interests as an end of international cooperation also finds reference
in Article 1.144 That this is not a general enunciation, but essentially
a call to tangible action in specific fields can be demonstrated that
the Charter itself created an Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) as one of the central pillars of the UN System.145
Chapter IX of the Charter is entirely dedicated to the promotion of
International Economic and Social Cooperation. It contains
remarkably far-reaching provisions, such as the compulsorily
requirement that other international agencies in related fields
142. U.N. Charter preamble.
143. Id.
144. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3.
145. Id. at art. 7, ¶ 1.

972

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

coordinate with the UN through the ECOSOC;146 and arming the
UN with the power to foster coordination among the said
agencies.147 Perhaps the most remarkable provision in this regard
is the pledge by member nations to take “joint and separate action
in cooperation”148 with the UN to achieve, inter alia, “higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development.”149
Since the UN Charter came into force, the obligation on States
to foster international economic and social cooperation has further
solidified and evolved. Its evolution has tended to focus on the
special circumstances faced by Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
and provide several accommodations for them, in a recognition of
their special circumstances. The Bretton Woods Institutions –
World Bank and the IMF – have special financial structures with
committed institutional funds and procedures specifically for the
purpose of encouraging economic growth in LDCs, with varying
degrees of success.150 The World Trade Organization provides a
litany of exemptions and staggered timelines for the
implementation of its decisions in LDCs.151 New LDCs joining the
WTO also exclusively enjoy significant leeway in implementing the
previously decided agreements of the WTO.152 The UN Millennium
Development Goals contained specific provisions for LDCs and
Developing Countries.153 This approach has been continued with
the Sustainable Development Goals as well, including
commitments for financial and technological resources.154
International agreements addressing issues that may have a
tangential economic impact also often ensure that provisions exist
to mitigate any adverse impact on LDCs. Examples of such an
146. Id. at art. 57, ¶ 1; id. at art. 63, ¶ 1.
147. Id. at art. 58.
148. Id. at art. 56.
149. Id. at art. 57(a).
150. See, e.g., Prabirjit Sarkar, IMF/World Bank Stabilisation Programmes:
A Critical Assessment, 26 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2307 (1991); Dane Rowlands,
New Lending to Less Developed Countries: The Effect of IMF, 29 CAN. J. ECON.
S443 (1996).
151. See, e.g., Kevin Kennedy, The 2005 TRIPS Extension for the Least
Developed Countries: A Failure of the Single Undertaking Approach?, 40 INT’L
L. 683 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Victor Mosoti, The Legal Implications of Sudan’s Accession to
the World Trade Organization, 103 AFR. AFF. 269 (2004); BRIAN HINDLEY,
ACCESSION TO THE WTO: BACKGROUND 11-16 (2008).
153. See LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES INDEPENDENT EXPERT GROUP,
Redefining International Development Cooperation, in TRANSFORMING GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT: AN LDC PERSPECTIVE ON THE POST-2015 AGENDA 10, 10-14
(2014).
154. See, e.g., KEY ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ADDIS ABABA ACCORD ON
FINANCING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 21-23 (Leadership Council of the
SDSN, Working Paper, 2015). / LEADERSHIP COUNCIL OF THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK, KEY ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ADDIS
ABABA ACCORD ON FINANCING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 21-23 (2015)
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approach can be found in climate change agreements, such as the
Paris Agreement of 2015, among others.155 Similarly, in the realm
of intellectual property, the Trade Related Aspects of the
Intellectual Property System Agreement (TRIPS) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have worked to ensure
effective access to information and technologies that could
otherwise have been prohibitively expensive for LDCs.156
Above is a condensed analysis of the numerous ways in which
international cooperation has been achieved for the purpose of
economic progress of LDCs. That a separate carve-out for the
economic benefit of LDCs is necessary is clearly borne out in
consistent and repeated State practice. Furthermore, the
invocations in the UN Charter, discussed above, also suggests that
since at least 1945, there has been a statutory force driving this
cooperation, lending the cooperation a color of legal obligation
necessary for it to be considered a practice “opinio juris.” Therefore,
in addition to being statutorily mandated by the numerous
agreements themselves, cooperation to ensure that economic and
social justice is secured for LDCs and their citizens has been carried
out by States as a consistent practice amounting to opinio juris. As
has been analyzed in the section titled “Textual Analysis” above,
consistent State practice with opinio juris is evidence of the
existence of a Customary International Law.157 Therefore, it can be
argued with sufficient strength that a State is obligated under
Customary International Law to provide its cooperation in ensuring
that LDCs receive the necessary space to ensure economic and
social development of their citizens. Per contra, any attempt to deny
them the means of such development would be a violation of their
rights and on part of the offending State, a violation of international
law.
2. Part IVB Significant Overlap between LDCs and LLS
Studies have drawn a correlation between the level of
development of a country and its status as a land-locked or coastal
State.158 The LLS’ inability to access the High Seas severely
hampers its ability to participate in international commerce. LLS
are distant from the Sea, but certain remote areas of very large
coastal States like Russia, China, Brazil, etc. are equally if not more
distant. M.L. Faye et al. have shown that, "Distance alone, however,

155. See, e.g., Helena Wright et. al., Impact of Climate Change on Least
Developed Countries, Are the SDGs Possible?, INT’L INST. ENV. & DEV. (2015).
156. See generally B.N. Pandey & Prabhat Kumar Saha, Technical
Cooperation Under TRIPS Agreement: Flexibilities and Options for Developing
Countries, 53 J. IND. L. INST. 652 (2011).
157. See Cook, supra note 89 (provides elements required to prove opinio
juris).
158. See e.g., infra note 1592;
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cannot explain why landlocked countries are at a disadvantage
compared with equally remote, inland regions of large countries."159
In addition to geography, LLS also must grapple with other
hurdles that operate within the countries they need to use for
transit. These include issues like the state of transport
infrastructure; bureaucratic and administrative hurdles such as
customs, taxes, and checkpoints; relations between the LLS and the
transit state; political stability, and security within the transit
states and along the routes.160
The condition of transport infrastructure in the transit State,
especially along the routes used by the LLS are important in
determining the cost of using those routes and the time taken for
goods to travel through the route. Poor infrastructure raises both
costs and time, affecting the competitiveness of the exports in the
international market, and make it difficult, expensive and even
longer for imports to reach LLS.161 Transportation levies like
customs and taxes also add to the costs of trading, whereas
procedural and bureaucratic requirements like frequent
checkpoints, upfront payment of customs, etc. create delays and
other problems for efficiency. For example, containers from
landlocked Afghanistan are subject to an arduous procedure while
using Pakistani ports which increases delay and costs.162
Deterioration of political relations can lead to the imposition of
blockages or embargos and LLS remain vulnerable to such tactics,
such as when Mongolia was forced to apologize to the People's
Republic of China in 2016 for a visit of the Dalai Lama in
Ulaanbaatar.163 Further, the security situation especially along the
transit route can affect the LLS access to the sea. Outbreaks of
protests, rioting, or an insurgency in a transit State can disrupt the
movement of goods along the route, even if the Transit State and
the LLS maintain friendly relations.
These factors have had a bearing on the economic development
of LLS. LLS have lower GDP than their coastal neighbors, and
"landlocked countries generally have significantly lower levels of

159. Michael L. Faye et. al., The Challenges Facing Landlocked Developing
Countries, 5 J. HUM. DEV. 31, 32 (2004).
160. Id. at 40.
161. Nuno Limão & Anthony J. Venables, Infrastructure, Geographical
Disadvantage, Transport Costs, and Trade, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 451
(2001).
162. Martin Ira Glassner, Transit Problems of Three Asian Landlocked
Countries: Afghanistan, Nepal, and Laos, 4 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS
SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 8-18 (1983).
163. Kallol Bhattacharjee, Mongolia Seeks Support Against China’s
‘Blockade’, HINDU (Dec. 7, 2016), www.thehindu.com/news/national/Mongoliaseeks-support-against-China%E2%80%99s%E2%80%98blockade%E2%80%99/article16769678.ece
[perma.cc/D2FMUV7S].
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development than the maritime countries of their region."164
3. Part IVC Implied Powers of the UN
The discussion surrounding the implied powers of
international organizations is a long-winded one. Two principal
actors of international law are international organizations and
States. The latter are often considered to be the principal actors in
International Law165 and have full-fledged legal personality. The
legal personality of international organizations, however, depends
on certain factors and is a matter of debate among scholars.166 Even
when an international organization is deemed to have an
independent legal personality, its extent and the accompanying
rights are not automatically decided. Scholars and jurists disagree
on whether the character of personality possessed by international
organizations is equal or subordinate to that of States.167 While
fascinating in and of itself, this is not a debate that falls within the
remit of this Article. However, the debate is relevant as it informs
our understanding of implied powers possessed by international
organizations. For the purposes of this study, our focus will be on
analyzing the implied powers doctrine with respect to the United
Nations.
a. The Implied Powers Doctrine is Incorporated in the U.S.
Constitution by the Necessary and Proper Clause
The Implied Powers Doctrine finds an emphatic and wellknown statutory incorporation in the U.S. Constitution. Known as
the Necessary and Proper Clause, it provides, "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or any Department or
Officer thereof."168
A look at the legislative history of the U.S. Constitution points

164. Faye et al., supra note 159, at 36.
165. Emerich de Vattel, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY §§1-12 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds.,
50th ed. 2008) (1797).
166. Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied
Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1970).
167. Ingrid Detter, LAW-MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2
(1965) (“The fact that, for example, an organization has international
personality does not indicate that it will enjoy any particular rights.”);
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 109 (1965) (“It is a mistake to jump to the
conclusion that an organization has personality and then to deduce specific
capacities from an a priori conception of the concomitants of personality.”).
168. U.S. CONST., art. 1, §8, cl. 18.

976

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

to considerable discussion on the existence and scope of this clause.
The two principal camps of the U.S. Constitutional Convention –
Federalists and Anti-Federalists – sparred over its inclusion in the
Constitution.169 The latter feared that its language would grant
carte blanche to the Federal Government in imposing its will upon
the States.170 The notoriety of the clause is evident in the nickname
it received from the anti-Federalists – the “Sweeping Clause.”171
Addressing these fears in the context of the power of taxation,
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the clause is, “[O]nly declaratory of
a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of constituting a federal government,
and vesting it with certain specified powers.”172
This phraseology suggests that while the clause may find its
first written exposition in the U.S. Constitution, the framers were
referencing a well-understood notion of law – presumably AngloSaxon law – prevalent at the time. The suspicion is confirmed when
one looks at James Madison’s commentary on the subject. He notes,
“No axiom is more clearly established by law, or in reason, than that
wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever
a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it is included.”173
There is some agreement that the clause was borrowed from
agency law principles in common law, existing at the time.174 The
Implied Powers Doctrine has since been a critical feature of
American jurisprudence. The position safeguarding States’ rights in
the U.S. has tended to limit federal powers by arguing that a
congressional action qualifies the standard only if it is incidental to
an enumerated power.175 On the other hand, those arguing for a
greater federal role in governance have taken the view that only an
explicit prohibition can defeat a congressional recourse to
necessity.176 Among these two extreme positions lie several other
interpretations and the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
also shifted with the political character of the Court.177 In the
169. Gary Lawson & Neil S. Siegel, Necessary and Proper Clause,
INTERACTIVE
CONST.,
www.constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/article-i/ [perma.cc/AFV9-APV6] (last visited July 4,
2020).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
174. Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 277 (2004).
175. Engstrom, supra note 138, at 132.
176. Id.
177. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Application by
U.S. Supreme Court of Necessary and Proper Clause of U.S. Constitution – U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 65 A.L.R. FED. 2D 161 (2012); John T. Valauri,
Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 773
(2013); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045
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context of international organizations – given the absence of a
written statute to consult – the existence of implied powers has been
more complex. Rules of interpretation have been employed, which
allow for the use of implied powers.178 Before proceeding to this
discussion however, it is important to establish if the United
Nations as an organization has a legal personality and if so, the
extent of that personality.
b. Repatriations Case Determines Whether the UN has a
Legal Personality
The clearest enunciation of the legal personality of the United
Nations came in the decision of the ICJ in the Repatriations Case.179
The court was convened to discuss if the UN has the competence to
bring an international claim for damages suffered by the
organization and its agents in the performance of services to the
organization, at the hands of States, some of which could also be
members of the UN.180
c.

Analysis of Four Conditions

One of the issues framed by the court was if the UN possessed
the requisite international personality – as distinct from its
constituent member States – to bring forth an international claim
for damages.181 In analyzing this issue, the court looked at four
conditions surrounding the organization’s formation and
existence.182 It noted that the Charter had created an organization
that was a) not only a meeting point for member States for the
achievement of certain ends enumerated in Article 1; but that it also
b) possessed specific organs; c) clothed with specific and specialized
functions; d) in which the member States occupied a position that
was detached from the organization itself, in certain respects.183 On
the basis of these four findings, the court concluded that the UN
was substantially more than a meeting ground where its members

(2014); Ilya Somin, Federal Power: Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary
and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239
(2010); Lauren E. Marsh, The Revival of the "Sweeping Clause": An Analysis of
Why the Supreme Court Had to "Breathe New Life" into the Necessary and
Proper Clause in United States v. Comstock, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 23 (2010).
178. See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 29-30 (2nd ed., 1911). (for an analysis of
techniques used in textual interpretation).
179. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep.174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations Case].
180. Id.
181. Id. at 176-77, 185.
182. Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied
Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 125 (1970).
183. Id.

978

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

could hash out issues, and as such constituted an actor in its own
right.184 The analysis of the court corresponds to – and perhaps
motivated – Brownlie’s characterization that proof of an
international legal personality in an organization can be found by
locating “the existence of legal powers exercisable on the
international plane.”185
d. Assessment of Scope After Legal Personality is
Recognized
Once a discernible legal personality is ascribed to the United
Nations, an assessment of its scope becomes important. In this
regard, the court’s opinion in the Repatriations Case is not as
helpful from the perspective of deriving a general picture. However,
Mr. Rama-Montaldo, former Dep. Director at the UN Office of Legal
Affairs, analyzes the court’s reasoning by pointing to an intriguing
conclusion. He divides the ruling into the following: rights arising
out of the legal personality; and, rights not arising from legal
personality but linked with the purposes and functions of the
organization.186 In the context of determining whether the UN had
the right to claim for its agents – given that the agent concerned
could also have claimed through her State, instead of the UN – the
court raised a point about implicit powers.187 This inquiry required
the Court to determine if the provisions of the Charter and powers
ascribed to the UN allowed it to afford protection to its agents when
they were working for the organization.188 The court noted that such
a power was afforded to the UN as a “necessary intendment” of the
Charter.189 Rama-Montaldo concludes the court opinion by noting
that, “ . . . along with certain non-expressed rights which arise from
the very international personality of an organization, there are
other non-expressed rights which can only be inferred from the
purposes and functions of each organization.”190
So, by virtue of its legal personality, UN gained standing to
state a claim against members, generally. By virtue of rights
inferred from the purposes and functions, UN gained the right to
protect its agents in its own right. Considering that our discussion
hinges on the ability of the UN to use its powers and functions under
Part X of the Charter to create a mechanism compelling transit
States to come to the negotiating table, we will focus on the latter
aspect. To do so, we will have to examine the standards for
application of the implied powers doctrine.
184. Reparations Case, supra note 179, at 185.
185. Brownlie, supra note 7, at 520.
186. Rama-Montaldo, supra note 182, at 128-29.
187. Id.
188. Reparations Case, supra note 179, at 184.
189. Id.
190. Rama-Montaldo, supra note 182, at 131.
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UN Gained the Right to Protect its Agents Via the
Implied Powers Doctrine

In the Repatriations Case, the ICJ elucidated the “necessary
implication” standard for determining the application of the
doctrine.191 The court summarized this by concluding, “[u]nder
international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication, as being essential to the
performance of its duties.”192
What constitutes “necessary implication” was debated even
within the bench during this case.193 The majority opinion notes
that when performing an entrusted function, it was clear that the
organization must have the ability to exercise functional protection
of its agents. Such an exercise, according to the court, is a
“necessary intendment” of the Charter.194 The majority
interpretation therefore presumes only a proximate relationship
between an enumerated function and the implied power sought to
be exercised. This is a comparatively liberal interpretation of the
Implied Powers Doctrine because it opens space for the
Organization’s discretion in choosing the mechanism through which
it wishes to exercise the ability – in this case, the functional
protection of its agents. The distinction is borne out in Judge
Hackworth’s dissenting judgement. Criticizing the majority
judgment, he argues that international organizations are formed of
certain enumerated and delegated powers and “powers not
expressed cannot be freely implied.”195 The only scenario where
implied powers may be exercised is one where it flows from, and is
“necessary to the exercise of powers expressly granted.”196 Thus,
Judge Hackworth’s conception of the doctrine would require an
actual necessity of the power exercised specifically, thereby
eliminating the discretion granted to the organization by the
majority. This is also reflected in the conclusion at which Judge
Hackworth subsequently arrives. He notes that given the absence
of a necessity for the UN to claim on behalf of the agent [since the
agent has an alternative remedy to claim through her member
State], the power could not be implied to have existed with the
UN.197
The two views presented above would become easier to
understand if the words “functions” and “powers” are understood to
191. Reparations Case, supra note 179, at 182-83.
192. Id. at 182.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 184.
195. Id. at 198-99
196. Id.
197. Id. at 204.
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have distinct meanings. When the majority speaks of the need for
the UN to “exercise a measure of functional protection of its
agents,”198 they are referring to a “Function” proper. This function
is then implemented by the organization by using the power to sue
for claims on behalf of the agent concerned. The majority’s
reasoning therefore first contemplates the existence of an “implied
function” of protecting the agents arising out of a function
“entrusted to the Organization.”199 This is then implemented by an
implied power of suing to claim on behalf of the agent. On the other
hand, Judge Hackworth seems to suggest that it would be wrong to
adopt such an approach because powers exercisable by the UN
should be limited to those directly flowing from, and necessary for
the implementation of the expressed powers. He does not seem to
agree with the idea that an expressed function of the UN may give
rise to implied functions, which then create space for the application
of the implied powers doctrine.
This distinction is also borne out further in the Effect of
Awards Case200 where the court was called to decide if the General
Assembly possessed the authority to create a tribunal with the
capacity to render binding judgements on the Organization. The
tribunal was sought for the purpose of adjudicating disputes
between the UN and its staff. The majority relied on the
Repatriations Case and held that effective adjudication of disputes
among Staff and the Organization was essential to the ensure the
“efficient working of the Secretariat”;201 as such, the capacity to
establish a tribunal arose as a “necessary intendment” of the
Charter.202 Here again, Judge Hackworth disagreed. He argued
that Article 22 of the Charter203 gave an express power to the
General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs for the
performance of the Organization’s functions, when and of the
character deemed necessary by the Assembly. In the face of this
express power, according to Judge Hackworth, it was wrong to
invoke the implied powers doctrine.204
The distinction between “Functions” and “Powers” has been
one that academics and jurists have grappled with for quite some
time. In the context of the UN, it has been elucidated by FerrariBravo and Giardina using the Certain Expenses of the United

198. Id. at 184.
199. Id.
200. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47 (July 13)
[hereinafter Effect of Awards Case].
201. Id. at 57.
202. Id. at 57.
203. UN Charter art. 22.
204. Effect of Awards Case, supra note 200, at 80-81.
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Nations205 case.206 However, while the analysis above borrows from
their distinction between poteri impliciti (implied powers) and
funzioni impliciti (implied functions) and is helpful in
understanding the differing logic of the majority and the minority,
it is legally untenable in the context of the UN. This is because, as
Rama-Montaldo points out, the UN Charter does not allow for this
distinction because it uses the words “Functions and Powers”
interchangeably.207 Therefore, while it is important from the
perspective of understanding the scope of the Implied Powers
Doctrine generally, the lexical distinction is not relevant for the
UN.208 There has been some argument that a distinction between
implied competence and included competence may be better suited
to the UN Context.209 Drawn by Mr. Rouyer-Hameray, the
distinction seeks to explain certain competences as being expressly
attributed to the Organization (included), and certain others
flowing as necessities from the former (implied).210 Intriguing as it
may be, the lexical difference does not do much to define the scope
of the implied powers doctrine which, given the prevailing opinion
of the court, seems to be set on a liberally constructed outlook.
Further discussion on this subject, therefore, would be beyond the
purview of this Article.211
The one limitation which seems to have emerged; however,
pertains to specialization. In the WHO Case of 1996,212 the ICJ
205. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J.
Rep 151 (July 20).
206. RICCARDO MONACO ET AL., Trattato istitutivo della communità
economica europea commentario Art. 137 – 248, at 1702 (1965) (See commentary
on article 235 of the Treaty).
207. Engstrom, supra note138, at 149-52 (highlighting the use of “Functions
and Powers” as the title of chapters relating to the General Assembly, Security
Council, and other organs in articles 10-24 and 62-87 of the U.N. Charter).
208. See, e.g., Interpretation of Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st,
1926. (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
16 (Aug. 28) (interpreting the implied powers of the Mixed Commission using
the functions assigned to it under the Dec. 1st Agreement); Jurisdiction of
European Commission of Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory
Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14, at ¶ 337 (Dec. 8) (highlighting the use of
the phrase “jurisdictional powers” in Art. 14 of the impugned agreement to
discuss implied authority); Competence of the Int’l Labour Org. in regard to Int’l
Regulation of Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture,
Advisory Opinion, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 2, at ¶ 49 (Aug. 12) (interpreting
the scope of powers in reference to the constitution of the organization.).
209. Engstrom, supra note 138, at 151.
210. See generally BERNARD ROUYER-HAMERAY, Les compétences implicites
des organisations internationales (1962) (differentiation between powers and
competence, and express and implied powers and competence).
211. See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 138, at 138-57 (discussing
the scope of implied powers doctrine.); see also, Miriam T. Rooney, International
Organizations and International Law, 6 INT'L. L. 16 (1972); Wojciech
Morawiecki, Functions of International Organizations, 3 POLISH ROUND TABLE
147 (1969) (discussing the attitude of the court in interpreting provisions).
212. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
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considered a request by the World Health Organization to declare
the use of nuclear weapons as violative of international law as well
as the WHO Constitution.213 In declining the adjudication as being
ultra vires the WHO’s competence, the ICJ evolved the principle of
specialty.214 The court held that, unlike States, international
organizations do not possess general competence.215 As such, their
powers were entrusted by the States and the limits of such powers
were a function of the common interest whose promotion those
States entrust to them the organization concerned.216

VI. PART IVD: A UN FACILITATED NEGOTIATION
MECHANISM
Now, the UNCLOS was born out of negotiations coordinated
and conducted under the aegis of the United Nations, and
subsidiary organs of the Organization. As such, its goals,
aspirations, and framework were designed by the Organization as
a collective and the Convention incorporates the will of its
signatories. We have already discussed in detail the scope of
Convention and elaborated upon its textual intent of bringing parity
among coastal States, LLS, and other geographically disadvantaged
States. In the context of LLS in particular, the Convention contains
detailed provisions – analyzed above – that seek to eliminate their
geographical limitations and provide them with access to the
“common heritage of mankind” located at sea. In doing so, the
Convention recognizes the sovereignty of transit States, but as
discussed above, this has been expanded beyond its rightful remit.
Furthermore, the United Nations has an obligation under Part
X of its Charter to foster cooperation for the achievement of better
socio-economic development across the world. In order to carry out
this task, it has been vested with wide ranging powers exercised by
a multitude of organizations. An emphatic approval of this mandate
also comes from the long history of work undertaken by the
organization in this regard which we have discussed in Part IVA
above. We have also noted that access to the sea is a critical factor
in improving a State’s economic and social conditions and LLS have
consistently lagged on this front, despite the guarantee afforded to
them under the Convention.217
Therefore, it is well-within the competence of the United

Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227 (July 8).
213.. World Health Organization Res. WHA46.40 (May 14, 1993).
214. Lawson and Siegel, supra note 17069, at 22.
215. Faye et al. supra note 159, at 25.
216. Id.
217. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 125.
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Nations to use its implied powers based on of its duties under Part
X of the UN Charter to effectuate the numerous initiatives it has
taken subsequently undertaken to remedy the economic and social
losses incurred by LLS due to the inadequate implementation of
their right of access. For this purpose, the UN should immediately
institute a compulsory negotiation process, where it acts as a
facilitator to negotiations under the Modalities Clause of the
Convention. Given the broad scope of obligations that transit States
have under the UN Charter and the Convention. For reasons
highlighted above, any Transit State (which is also a member of the
UN and signatory to the Convention) which refuses to participate
in this process would be in clear violation of international law. In
addition, bad faith attempts at delaying, or any attempt at denying
the LLS of a proper right of access would also constitute a similar
violation. A UN-facilitated process alone can ensure timely and
proper implementation of the spirit of the Convention and respect
the rights and sovereignty of all member States. Given the level of
economic costs incurred by LLS due to inadequate access to the sea,
it is also incumbent upon the UN to fulfill its mandate in this
regard.

VII. PART V: THE LAW OF NECESSITY AND EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
The narrow sovereignty exception of “compelling and
overriding interest” as envisaged in the UNCLOS can be further
squeezed, if not altogether eliminated in situations where Necessity
would operate. Such “emergency situations” are ones where we
argue that a landlocked State has to resort to means of seeking
access to the sea even if that means doing so in complete disregard
of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the transit State. In
practice, it will be difficult for a landlocked developing country to be
able to overcome the obstacles to its access placed by a more
powerful and resource laden transit State, especially without
assistance from a third country. This, however, does not mean that
international law cannot recognize the availability of such a
remedy.

A. The Doctrine of Necessity
The Doctrine of Necessity acts as a remedy for a State to escape
from its obligations under international law. This doctrine has a
long history that stretches as far back as the seventeenth century
to the works of Hugo Grotius. 218 The International Law
Commission too, has enshrined it in its report the “Draft Articles on

218. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (Jean Barbeyrac & Richard
Tuck eds., 1965).
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Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.”219
Initially, the Doctrine of Necessity was tied to the right of a State
to act in self-preservation. According to Roman Boed, "That is to
say, when a threat to self-preservation arose, it was considered
justified to take any steps necessary to preserve one's existence,
even if such steps would have been unlawful had they been taken
in the absence of a threat to self-preservation."220 Most early
scholars like Grotius221 and Vattel,222 among others, agreed around
this basic notion of Necessity. As the ILC itself explained,
This idea had its origin in the nineteenth century in the widespread
belief that there were certain "fundamental rights" and that they
necessarily prevailed over the State's other rights. The so-called
"right" defined as the "right of existence", or more often as the "right
of self-preservation" . . . was, it was held, the subjective right that
should take precedence over the subjective rights of another State.223

B. Early Notions of the Necessity Doctrine
The early notions of Necessity became the basis for a series of
international legal precedent and state practice. As early as the
Neptune Arbitration of 1797, the Commissioners reflected upon the
writings of Grotius and deliberated the applicability of Necessity;
though they rejected its applicability on the facts of the case but
upheld it as a maxim of international law.224 Over the years, as
Sykes describes,
Necessity has been invoked to justify a wide range of actions under
circumstances that seemingly satisfy this criterion, including a brief
incursion into the territory of another state to interdict support for
rebels (the Caroline case), measures to protect animal populations
from serious overfishing or hunting to extinction (the Fisheries
Jurisdiction and Russian Fur Seals cases), the destruction of a
foundering ship to prevent a massive oil spill (the Torrey Canyon
case), and the appropriation of foreign property that was necessary to
provide subsistence to troops engaged in resisting a rebellion (the

219. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 26-30, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter ILC Report 2001].
220. Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1,4 (2000).
221. Grotius, supra note 218.
222. Vattel, supra note 165.
223. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in
[1980] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2)
[refer to the commentary on Article 33].
224. Ryan Manton, Necessity in International Law, (2016) (unpublished
PhD thesis, Oxford University) (on file with Oxford University Research
Archive) at 20.
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Anglo-Portuguese dispute of 1832).225

The International Law Commission, however, sought to
expand the applicability of the Doctrine of Necessity. Article 25226
of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Conduct (or Articles of State Responsibility) reads:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity
with an international obligation of that State unless the
act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril;
and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.

C. Expansion of the Necessity Doctrine
The ILC's attempted expansion of this doctrine has led to a
series of controversies and debates from the force of Necessity to its
scope and applicability. The ILC in its report sought to expand the
scope of Necessity from its traditional applicability when a State is
facing a threat to its existence, to one where it is trying to safeguard
an “essential interest.”227 Roberto Ago, in his Addendum to the
Eighth report on State responsibility suggests this expansion by
stating that “essential interest” would include threats to the
"political or economic survival, the continued functioning of its
essential services, the maintenance of internal peace, the survival
of a sector of its population, the preservation of the environment of

225. Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AM. J.
INT’L L. 296, 308 (2015).
226. ILC Report 2001, supra note 219, at 28 (art. 25).
227. See supra part V.
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its territory or a part thereof, etc."228
The tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina drew upon the works of
Robert Ago, Julio Barboza, and James Crawford and concluded that
"[w]hat qualifies as an ‘essential’ interest is not limited to those
interests referring to the State’s existence. As evidence
demonstrates, economic, financial or those interests related to the
protection of the State against any danger seriously compromising
its internal or external situation, are also considered essential
interests."229 In Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal
held that "the term ‘essential interest’ can encompass not only the
existence and independence of a State itself, but also other
subsidiary but nonetheless ‘essential’ interests, such as the
preservation of the State’s broader social, economic and
environmental stability."230
Necessity must not only be used by a State to defend its
“essential interest,” but it must also do so against a “grave and
imminent peril.” 231 “Grave peril” implies the gravity of potential
damage to the essential interest. It appears the ILC has just
adopted this condition from the "extreme necessity"232 qualification
of Grotius on the acquisition of property of neutral states at the time
of War. The ICJ in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project judgement
held that "[i]mminence is synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or
‘proximity’ and goes far beyond the concept of possibility."233 That
does not exclude, in the view of the Court, that a "peril" appearing
in the long term might be held to be "imminent" as soon as it is
established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of
that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain
and inevitable."234 Although, the applicability of this provision will
be highly dependent on the precise nature of facts and
circumstances under which the State chooses to invoke Necessity.
States invoking Necessity must also establish that their
actions were the “only way” of protecting their essential interest
from a grave and imminent peril.235 This means that the State has
to show that no lawful alternative was available to the State. The
ILC further explains that

228. Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Addendum to the eighth report
on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, 14
(1980). [hereinafter addendum by Mr. Ago]
229. LG&E Energy Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, (2006), 46 I.L.M. 36 (2014), ¶ 251 [hereinafter LG Arbitration].
230. Id., ¶ 346.
231. ILC Report 2001, supra note 219, at 28 (art. 25).
232. Boed, supra note 220, at 5
233. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. vs. Slovak.), Judgment, 1997
I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept 25) (hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros judgement).
234. Id.
235. See Article 25, Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the work of its fifty-third
session, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries. U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 80 (2001).
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the adoption by that State of conduct not in conformity with an
international obligation binding it to another State must definitely
have been its only means of warding off the extremely grave and
imminent peril which it apprehended; in other words, the peril must
not have been escapable by any other means, even a more costly one,
that could be adopted in compliance with international obligations.236

However, scholars continue to debate on the nature of
strictness applied to the interpretation of the “only way” condition.
Ryan Manton discusses at length the strict approach adopted by the
tribunals in the CMS, Enron and Sempra cases, as well as the
lenient approach adopted by the tribunal in the LG&E v. Argentina
Arbitration. Manton concludes that,
[t]here is clearly a middle ground to be reached between the
uncontrollable looseness of the LG & E tribunal’s approach and the
unrealistic strictness of the approach taken by the CMS, Enron and
Sempra tribunals. The preceding discussion has contended that an
appropriate middle ground can be reached by recognizing that ‘only’
means ‘only’, but also that the ‘only’ way must be understood as the
only feasible and effective way.237

Although the scope of the “only way” condition is the subject of
an enthralling discussion, it goes beyond the scope of this Article.
Another qualification that has to be satisfied by the State
invoking Necessity is the condition of balancing interests.238
According to Bin Cheng, "[a]s States are equal, the conflicting
interests are thus also of equal importance.”239 However, as Ryan
Manton demonstrates, "necessity is designed to apply only in the
most exceptional of situations. It is inherently unlikely that a State
against which necessity is invoked will also happen to face a
comparably, let alone more, exceptional situation."240
LLS could use the Necessity clause to claim temporary access
to the sea. This would be prevalent in the cases where the lack of
access is causing or will necessarily cause severe hardship to the
citizens of the country. LLS are dependent on access to the coastline
for economically securing a supply of many essential goods and
commodities. In 2017, when Pakistan closed its border with
Afghanistan, despite having a Transit Agreement, it led to an
economic crisis in Afghanistan.241 Dr. Suraya Dalil, the Ambassador
and Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the UN office at
Geneva, said, “[m]oreover, closing the entry points at the Durand

236. Addendum by Mr. Ago. supra note 228.
237. Manton, supra note 237.
238. See supra note 235.
239. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 75 (1953).
240. Manton, supra note 237.
241. Mujib Mashal, Closed Afghan-Pakistani Border Is Becoming
‘Humanitarian Crisis’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/03/0
5/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-border.html [perma.cc/RDW2-C8G8].
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line had adverse effects on the entire economy and population of
Afghanistan. After a few days, shortages occurred of basic goods,
pushing their prices to levels where many Afghans cannot afford
them.”242
In such cases, where the lack of access to a coastline could lead
to a situation of complete political or economic breakdown, it would
become legally possible for a LLS to claim access to the sea, in order
to mitigate a humanitarian crisis. It is now accepted that a severe
economic crisis can be used by a State to invoke Necessity.243
Circumstances such as what was faced by Afghanistan would meet
not just the threshold of “essential interest” contained in Article
25,244 but also the much higher benchmark of an existential threat
to the State. According to Vattel,
The earth was designed to feed its inhabitants; and he who is in want
of everything is not obliged to starve because all property is vested in
others. When, therefore, a nation is in absolute want of provisions,
she may compel her neighbors, who have more than they want for
themselves, to supply her with a fair share of them at a fair price: she
may even take it by force, if they will not sell.245

Such situations not only lead to a “grave and imminent peril”
but often enough also fulfil the “only way” condition. Examples of
Afghanistan,246 Mongolia,247 among others have shown that the lack
of access to the sea can bring a LLS’s economy to a point of near
total breakdown, therefore causing “grave and imminent peril.”
Alternative routes or methods, such as airlifting often also remain
unfeasible, especially in economic crises as they make importing
essential commodities unaffordable to the population.248 Faced with
such exceptional situations, we argue, LLS would be well placed to
resort to a plea of Necessity as an “Emergency Provision.”

242. Shreerupa Mitra, Pakistan Closes Durand Line, Causes $90 mn Trade
Loss for Afghanistan, FIRSTPOST, (Apr. 12, 2017, 8:27 PM), www.firstpost.co
m/world/pakistan-closes-durand-line-causes-90-mn-trade-loss-for-afghanistan3381260.html [perma.cc/G7HY-PW9G].
243. Sykes, supra note 225.
244. See supra note 235.
245. Vattel, supra note 165.
246. See supra note 235
247. Lobsang Tenchoe, Mongolia Seeks India’s Support After China’s
Transportation Blockade, TIBET EXPRESS (Dec. 7, 2016), www.tibetexpress.net/
4553/mongolia-seeks-indias-support-after-chinas-transportation-blockade/
[perma.cc/H8GD-ETSP].
248. Air Freight: A Market Study with Implications for Landlocked
Countries, WORLD BANK, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/transport/publication/ai
r-freight-study [perma.cc/9LEH-LYVJ] (last visited Sep. 9, 2020).
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VIII. PART VI: THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR INDIA
India has geopolitical interests in many LLS. Nepal and
Bhutan are two LLS that border India. India also has strategic
interests in Afghanistan, with whom India would effectively share
a small border, were it not for territory currently occupied by
Pakistan (see Map 1).
Map 1 (India-Afghanistan-Pakistan trijunction) – Source: Google
Earth

Further, the resource rich Central Asian countries are
important for India from an economic perspective; and India has
also attempted to build a strategic relationship with Mongolia.249
Further, India has also been working to expand its footprint in
Africa, which is also home to several LLS.250 Pioneering the rights
of LLS not only helps India advance its strategic interests vis-a-vis
these LLS but also increases its stature globally. Through this
paper, we discuss the scenario in Nepal, Afghanistan, and
Mongolia, along with India’s interests and how India can make
headway on them by supporting the Rights of these LLS to Access
the Sea.
1. The Case for Nepal
Nepal is a major landlocked country in South Asia. Often
249. Anil Trigunayat, India-Mongolia: The Spiritual Neighbours Embark on
an Enhancing Journey, FIN. EXPRESS (Sep. 23, 2019), www.financialexpress.
com/defence/india-mongolia-the-spiritual-neighbours-embark-on-anenhancing-journey/1715139/ [perma.cc/T9DJ-P7UR].
250. Elizabeth Roche, New Delhi Begins Expanding Its Diplomatic Footprint
In Africa, LIVEMINT (Feb. 4, 2019), www.livemint.com/politics/policy/new-delhibegins-expanding-its-diplomatic-footprint-in-africa-1549303805195.html
[perma.cc/EB3N-98DG].
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described as a “yam between two boulders,”251 it is surrounded by
two larger and more powerful neighbors, India and China. Nepal’s
links with India, however, run much deeper than those with China.
Not only is Nepal surrounded by India on three sides, it also has
deep cultural, ethnic, and historical links; apart from the
commercial and political associations the two countries have
enjoyed for decades.252 Nepal’s foreign relations are largely shaped
by its geographical considerations. Located in the Himalayas with
its natural orientation towards India, Nepal has remained heavily
dependent on its Southern neighbor, especially for its international
commerce.253 So much that even India’s main rival in South Asia
and Nepal’s only other neighboring country, the People’s Republic
of China, has shown reluctance to intervene in Nepal as a
counterweight to India, despite official Nepali insistence.254 As
Constantino Xavier reports, “[s]uccessive generations of Nepalese
leaders have, therefore, been politely cold-shouldered with typical
Chinese aphorisms such as ‘there are two sides to a mountain, and
you should always know on which side you are on’ or ‘distant waters
don’t help put out a fire on your doorstep.’”255
Nepal’s orientation towards India has resulted in the former’s
complete dependence on the latter for access to international
markets. As a result, many scholars often suggest that Nepal is not
just landlocked, but “India locked.”256 Prior to the 1950s, most of
Nepal’s trade was with India and a small portion with Tibet and
hence no transit arrangements were needed.257 In 1950, India and
Nepal signed a Treaty of Trade and Commerce, by which India
allowed Nepal transit rights through its territory and the use of
Indian ports for the export of Nepali goods.258 This was the first of
many such agreements signed between the two countries; the latest
of these were two separate treaties of trade and Transit signed in

251. Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy & David M. Malone, A Yam Between Two
Boulders: Nepal's Foreign Policy Caught Between India and China, www.
cambridge.org/core/books/nepal-in-transition/yam-between-two-bouldersnepals-foreign-policy-caught-between-india-andchina/345A9D2EBFA84969967E67123D03D39A [perma.cc/RDW8-KETS].
252. Nepal-India Relations, GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, www.mofa.gov.np/nepal-india-relations/ [perma.cc/76HF-EX5G] (last
visisted Jan. 21, 2021).
253. Nepal’s Trade Dependency on India Swells in 2000s, KATHMANDU POST
(Feb. 4, 2014) www.kathmandupost.com/money/2014/02/04/nepals-tradedependency-on-india-swells-in-2000s [perma.cc/4RVY-UXA6].
254. Constantino Xavier, Opinion, How Nepal and India Can Keep Their
Relationship Special, WIRE (Aug. 25, 2017), www.thewire.in/diplomacy/nepalindia-relations-china [perma.cc/FB24-VFUP].
255. Id.
256. Sujeev Shakya, Opinion, Freedom from being ‘India-locked’: on Nepal-India
relations, HINDU (July 5, 2018, 12:06 AM), www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/fre
edom-from-being-india-locked/article24333421.ece [perma.cc/G58X-CWAK].
257. Glassner, supra note 162, at 20.
258. Id.
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1999, but revised subsequently.259 Over the years, while India
continued to be among its largest trade partners, Nepal was also
heavily dependent on India for international commerce and thirdparty trade.260 Since the 1950s, Nepal has used Indian
infrastructure and ports to export to third party countries, due to
the geographical circumstances of Nepal.261 While the two countries
share an open border and citizens of both countries can travel and
reside in each other’s territories without visa or passport, this
openness and dependence has made Nepal vulnerable to pressures
from India.262
For decades, India enjoyed a monopoly over Nepal’s access to
the sea.263 Much of this was prompted by geography. The Himalayas
acting as South Asia’s natural boundary made it difficult for Nepal
to access China via Tibet. For Nepal, access to the sea via India was
not just financially viable, but infrastructurally allowed for a
shorter route, easier terrain, and availability of multiple streams
which historically aided river navigation (see Map 2). While Nepal
did succeed in diversifying international markets for its goods,
India remained its only access to those markets.264 India’s monopoly
endured over the decades, despite highs and lows in the bilateral
relationship between the two countries, which includes a thirteenmonth long blockade starting in 1989.265

259. India, Nepal Review Trade and Transit Treaties, SASEC (Apr. 30,
2018), www.sasec.asia/index.php?page=news&nid=860&url=ind-nep-trade-tra
nsit-treaties-for-review [perma.cc/8JRE-9HYR].
260. Catherine Wong, China and Nepal Sign Off On Ports Deal to Ease
Kathmandu’s Dependence On India For Trade, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May
2, 2019, 9:30 PM), www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3008617/chinaand-nepal-sign-ports-deal-ease-kathmandus-dependence
[perma.cc/5ZLKGLJ3].
261. Glassner, supra note 162, at 21.
262. See Hari Bansh Jha, Nepal’s Border Relations with India and China, 4
EURASIAN BORDER REV. 63, www.133.50.171.227/BorderStudies/en/publication
s/review/data/ebr4/V4_N1_04Jha.pdf [perma.cc/67E3-NHWD].
263. Gopal Sharma, Nepal Says China to Allow Access to Ports, Ending
Indian Monopoly On Transit, REUTERS (Sep. 7, 2018, 7:44 AM), www.reuters
.com/article/us-china-nepal-ports/nepal-says-china-to-allow-access-to-portsending-indian-monopoly-on-transit-idUSKCN1LN1KJ [perma.cc/SJE7-BZY2].
264. Kathmandu Post, Nepal Looks To End India Dependency For Overseas
Shipping, ASIA NEWS NETWORK, www.asianews.network/2019/05/08/nepal-look
s-to-end-india-dependency-for-overseas-shipping/ [perma.cc/S8RN-P8JQ] (last
updated May 8, 2019).
265. Suhasini Haidar, Blame Game On India and Nepal as Trucks Pile Up,
HINDU,
www.thehindu.com/news/national/blame-game-between-india-andnepal-as-trucks-pile-up/article7692820.ece
[perma.cc/RN2X-TPXM]
(last
updated Sep. 27, 2015, 1:19 AM).
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Map 2 (Terrain map of India, Nepal and China) (Source: Department of
Field Support, Geographic Section, United Nations (Dec 2011).

However, Nepal renewed and made concerted efforts to seek an
alternative route to access the sea after the 2015 Madhesi Blockade
of Nepal.266 Madhesi’s, an ethnic group in the Terai foothills of
Nepal had been clashing with two other groups in the region, the
Tharus and the Kirantis over competing demands related to the
new Constitution that Nepal had yet to pass.267 The Madhesis had
long asked for proportional representation in legislative bodies, but
their major demand was for a separate province within Nepal which
was separate from areas dominated by the Tharu community.268
266. See Krishna Pokharel, The Two-Month Blockade of Nepal Explained,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2015, 11:30 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/BL-IRTB-30919
[perma.cc/8NJ7-8W4A].
267. Narayan Upadhyay, Redrawing of Provinces Poses Difficulties, RISING
NEPAL, www.therisingnepal.org.np/news/5715 [perma.cc/MRJ9-FAZK] (last
visited Sep. 6, 2020).
268. Pramod Jaiswal, Nepal’s Constitutional Questions and Madhesi
Aspirations, INST. PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. (Jan. 7, 2016), www.ipcs.org/comm
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Thus, on September 20, 2015, when the Nepali Constitution was
passed, the Madhesis who felt that their demands had not been met
started an agitation. This agitation quickly turned into a blockade
of Nepal, which meant that the landlocked state was short of fuel
and supplies coming in from outside including India.269
Nepal maintained that the 2015 blockade was an “unofficial
Indian blockade,” due to India’s support for the Madhesi community
in Nepal.270 Madhesis, as an ethnic group, are viewed not just as
pro-India but also of Indian descent.271 They also have cultural,
ethnic, and linguistic ties to people living in the Indian States of
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.272 The Indian government, on the other
hand, denied any involvement and maintained that the blockade
was a result of internal strife within Nepal, creating fear for those
wanting to carry cargo into Nepal.273
However, the Nepali Government and the people squarely
blamed this blockade on Nepal.274 Protests erupted in Nepal and
abroad against what was seen as India acting like a “big brother”
and interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs.275 Nepal’s economy,
which was already struggling due to the devastating earthquake
earlier in 2015, was hit very hard by the blockade. 276 There was a
massive shortage of essential commodities across the country,
especially of food and fuel causing a lot of hardship to the common
_select.php?articleNo=4955 [perma.cc/UN5N-WM52]; see also id.
269. Anumeha Yadav, Opinion, Is India Really Behind Nepal’s Economic
Blockade?, SCROLL (Feb. 4, 2016, 09:15 AM), www.scroll.in/article/802653/isindia-really-behind-nepals-economic-blockade [perma.cc/5H3B-4DAK].
270. Tika R Pradhan, Unofficial Indian Blockade Has Led To Humanitarian
Crisis: PM, HIMALAYAN TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015, 3:01 AM), www.thehimalay
antimes.com/nepal/unofficial-indian-blockade-has-led-to-humanitarian-crisispm/ [perma.cc/38NL-T2K9].
271. ANI, Wrong to Say Madhesis of Indian Origin: Nepalese Envoy, BUS.
STANDARD, www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/wrong-to-say-madhe
sis-of-indian-origin-nepalese-envoy-115112300869_1.html
[perma.cc/ZEM6Y37U] (last updated Nov. 23, 2015, 6:22 PM).
272. Puja Sen, What Are Nepal's Madhesis Fighting For?, WIRED (Jul. 21,
2016),
www.thewire.in/external-affairs/nepal-madhesi-protests
[perma.cc/G8XQ-6VNJ].
273. Sugam Pokharel, Nepal Accuses India of ‘Trade Blockade’ Amid Fuel
Crisis, CNN (Oct. 3, 2015, 9:41 AM), www.edition.cnn.com/2015/09/29/asia/nep
al-india-fuel-crisis/ [perma.cc/883W-4D8D].
274. Bishwanath Ghosh, Anger Against India Over Blockade Snowballs In
Nepal, HINDU, www.thehindu.com/news/national/anger-against-india-overblockade-snowballs-in-nepal/article8032072.ece [perma.cc/Y7TF-HJUQ] (last
updated Sep. 2, 2016, 12:05 AM)
275. PTI, ‘Big Brother’ Attitude of India Unacceptable: Nepal Leader, Indian
Express (Nov. 29, 2015, 12:32 PM), www.indianexpress.com/article/india/indianews-india/big-brother-attitude-of-india-unacceptable-nepal-leader/
[perma.cc/2HN7-GQMG].
276. PTI, Economic cost of blockade much more than impact of quake: Nepal,
Econ. Times (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:08 PM), www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne
ws/international/world-news/economic-cost-of-blockade-much-more-thanimpact-of-quake-nepal/articleshow/50208273.cms [perma.cc/QP2C-6XEH].

994

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

people. Nepal’s Ambassador to India said that “the economic cost of
the blockade is more than the cost we had to incur due to the
massive quake.”277 According to Telegraph India, “[t]he loss to the
Nepal economy because of the blockade is being pegged wildly at
anywhere between USD 2 billion and 10 billion, depending on who
one speaks to.”278 Nepal’s GDP growth rate also plummeted from
6% in 2014, to 3.3% in 2015, to a further low of 0.6% in 2016.279
The 2015 blockade was a watershed moment for Nepal’s
foreign policy and its relations with India. As India was considered
responsible for the blockade, the relations between the two
countries also became bitter.280 Nepal actively started searching for
alternative routes to get supplies of essential commodities, not just
to meet the immediate emergent demand but also for the long
term.281 The main impetus for this was to reduce, if not bring an end
to, dependence on India. However, by now the scenario in South
Asia had undergone a change. China, Nepal’s northern neighbor,
had earlier been reluctant to intervene on behalf of Nepal in its
tensions with India due to the pragmatism of geopolitics.282 Post the
2015 blockade, however, China had become more powerful and
capable of committing more resources to Nepal. Furthermore,
technological advances in infrastructure, communication, and
transportation had made it much easier now to navigate the
Himalayas and access Nepal via China.283
As a result, Nepal took a number of steps towards gradually
ending Indian monopoly on Nepal. In October 2015, Nepal signed
an agreement with China for the supply of petroleum products,
which ended India’s four decade old monopoly in this sector.284 This
277. Id.
278. V. Kumara Swamy, Opinion, 'I Will Never Forgive What India Has
Done To Me', TELEGRAPH (Oct. 25, 2015), www.telegraphindia.com/7-days/39-iwill-never-forgive-what-india-has-done-to-me-39/cid/1313727 [perma.cc/J4GHYWKV].
279. GDP Growth Nepal, WORLD BANK, www.data.worldbank.or
g/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NP [perma.cc/HR64-SSDA] (last
visited June 24, 2020).
280. Press Trust of India, Nepal-India Ties Shouldn't Degrade, China No
Substitute: Nepali Economist, BUS. STANDARD, www.business-standard.com/
article/current-affairs/nepal-india-ties-shouldn-t-degrade-china-no-substitutenepali-economist-120061500811_1.html [perma.cc/Y86Q-G3GF] (last updated
Jun. 15, 2020, 11:25 PM).
281. Sanjeev Giri, Blockade, Energy Shortages Goad Country Into Looking
For Solutions, KATHMANDU POST (Oct. 5, 2015), www.kathmandupost.com/mon
ey/2015/10/05/blockade-energy-shortages-goad-country-into-looking-forsolutions [perma.cc/8TR8-2496].
282. Constantino Xavier, supra note 254.
283. Pradumna Bickram Rana, China’s Proposals for Trans-Himalayan
Connectivity: Consider Four Economic Corridors, 154 RSIS Comment. 1 (2014),
www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/chinas-proposals-for-trans-himalayanconnectivity-consider-four-economic-corridors/#.Xy1HbCgzY2w
[perma.cc/FS4N-N7G3].
284. Utpal Parashar, Ending Indian Monopoly, Nepal Signs Deal With
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was followed by Nepalese Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli’s visit to
Beijing, where he signed a number of Agreements with China
focused on improving transport and connectivity, including access
to Chinese ports.285 Transport infrastructure to improve
connectivity between the two countries started almost immediately
and progress has been ongoing.286 This includes a number of
strategically important projects such as a high-speed railway line
connecting Xigaze, Tibet’s second largest city to Kathmandu,
Nepal’s capital.287 This was followed by an announcement in 2018,
wherein China allowed Nepal access to the Chinese ports of Tianjin,
Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang; thereby, at least in theory,
ending Indian monopoly on Nepal’s access to the Sea.288
Chinese ports can neither immediately nor entirely replace
Nepal’s dependence on Indian ports, but it can surely reduce India’s
coercive power vis-à-vis Nepal. Infrastructure along the route from
Nepal to the ports of China needs to be developed, and there are
various doubts about the feasibility of this project as far as
distances and costs are concerned.289 However, despite these
China To Import Fuel, Hindustan Times, (Oct. 29, 2015, 5:54 PM), www.hind
ustantimes.com/world/fuel-starved-nepal-turns-to-china-after-india-restrictssupply/story-Nlpx8zyEuwlOVBBXxczSKP.html [perma.cc/L3A2-2N7Z].
285. Rishi Iyengar, Opinion, What the Nepalese Prime Minister's Visit to
China Says About the Wider Politics of Asia, T IME (Mar. 24, 2016, 4:06 AM),
www.time.com/4270239/nepal-prime-minister-oli-visit-china-beijing-india/
[perma.cc/KS53-7CR9].
286. See K J M Varma, China Nepal Sign Protocol To Operationalise Key
Transit Treaty To Access Chinese Ports, WEEK (Apr. 3, 2020, 9:07 PM),
www.theweek.in/wire-updates/business/2019/04/30/fgn24-china-nepal-tta.html
[perma.cc/6L73-JSAE]; PTI, China Opens Dual-Use Highway To Nepal Via
Tibet,
ECON.
TIMES,
www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinaopens-dual-use-highway-to-nepal-via-tibet/articleshow/60730104.cms?utm
_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[perma.cc/Z8LY-RWR9] (last updated Sep. 8, 2017, 1:15 PM); Ramesh Bhushal,
Nepal-China Railway Project: Fantasy Or Reality?, THIRD POLE (Jun. 18, 2019),
www.thethirdpole.net/2019/06/18/nepal-china-railway/ [perma.cc/JRZ9-4A9W];
Prahlad Rijal, Nepali And Chinese Officials Stress Road Connectivity To Boost
Tourist Arrivals From China, KATHMANDU POST (Dec. 13, 2019),
www.kathmandupost.com/money/2019/12/13/nepali-and-chinese-officialsstress-road-connectivity-to-boost-tourist-arrivals-from-china [perma.cc/W622JR4Z].
287. Bikash Sangraula, To Decrease Its Dependence On India, Nepal Eagerly
Awaits China Rail Plan, Japan Times (Oct. 11, 2019), www.japantimes.co.jp
/news/2019/10/11/business/dependent-on-india-nepal-awaits-chinarail/#.XljnMqgzY2w [perma.cc/K96T-6C68].
288. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Opinion, Why Nepal’s Access to China
Ports Matters, DIPLOMAT (Sep. 14, 2018), www.thediplomat.com/2018/09/whynepals-access-to-china-ports-matters/ [perma.cc/VA5G-DCFW].
289. See Kamal Dev Bhattarai, The Limits of Nepal’s China Outreach,
DIPLOMAT (Sep. 13, 2018), www.thediplomat.com/2018/09/the-limits-of-nepalschina-outreach/ [perma.cc/K2MY-5FTE]; Ed Peters, China-Nepal Railway:
Debt Trap, Godsend, Threat to India, or Just a Pie in the Sky?, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Dec. 1, 2019, 10:15 AM), www.scmp.com/week-
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hurdles, it has its own advantages for Nepal, chief of which is the
end of Indian monopoly.
Afraid of losing its hegemonic cloud, India has taken various
steps to discourage Nepal from taking the China route. These are
also aimed at repairing Indo-Nepal relations and its image as a
country which interferes in Nepal’s internal matters.290 As a result,
India has decided to revamp and expand the infrastructure that
connects Nepal to the Indian ports.291 In 2016, India also opened up
the port of Visakhapatnam, in addition to Kolkata for Nepal to
export its cargo and therefore have access to the sea.292
Nepal, however, has made it clear that while it welcomes
India’s attempts to improve ties with Nepal and facilitate its access
to the sea, it also wishes to explore the opportunity of accessing the
sea via China. Kamal Thapa, Nepal’s foreign Minister, said “We
(Nepal) would like to take advantage from both our neighbors but
not at the cost of each other. Nepal does not have a policy of playing
cards against each other.”293 Irrespective of whether the 2015
blockade had Indian backing or not, the sheer hardship faced by the
people of Nepal and its devastating impact on the economy means
that it is highly unlikely that Nepal would get discouraged from
looking for an alternate route to access the Sea.294 Nepal has
historically as well been at odds with India in cases involving
transit access, and the issue has been a source of friction between
the two countries.295 Although the India route might appear more
advantageous and economical for Nepal to access the sea, at least
until the infrastructure across the proposed China route is fully
developed, it appears highly unlikely that Nepal will be persuaded
into abandoning the China route completely.
It is in the light of these circumstances that India must look to
reorient its policy towards Nepal, especially over the issues of Trade
and Transit. While Nepal, along with other LLS has been
demanding a Right to Access the Sea along, India should look to
asia/politics/article/3039995/china-nepal-railway-debt-trap-godsend-threatindia-or-just-pie [perma.cc/MXZ4-5FW7].
290. India Nepal Agree on Key Infrastructure Projects, DDNEWS (Jul, 14,
2018), www.ddnews.gov.in/national/india-nepal-agree-key-infrastructure-proje
cts [perma.cc/3ZXN-AA8N].
291. Anil Giri & Suresh Raj Neupane, Inland Waterways Become Part of
Nepal-India Trade and Transit Treaties, KATHMANDU POST (Mar. 20, 2019),
www.kathmandupost.com/national/2019/03/20/inland-waterways-become-partof-nepal-india-trade-and-transit-treaties [perma.cc/BSP6-8USR].
292. Id.
293. Sangeeta Thapliyal, Landlocked Nepal and Its Foreign Policy, 149 J.
UNITED SERV. INST. INDIA (2019), www.usiofindia.org/publication-type/usijournal/page/11/ [perma.cc/5UNL-VCAW].
294. TT Bureau, 'I Will Never Forgive What India Has Done To Me',
TELEGRAPH INDIA (Oct. 25, 2015, 12:00 AM), www.telegraphindia.com/7-days/
39-i-will-never-forgive-what-india-has-done-to-me-39/cid/1313727
[perma.cc/6WWW-RV32].
295. Glassner, supra note 162, at 21-25.
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support Nepal along with other LLS in this endeavor. Such a move
will help India win back a lot of goodwill lost during the 2015
blockade, which was seen as India trying to coerce Nepal by cutting
off its access to the Sea, and therefore essential supplies. If India
offers support or even takes the initiative towards allowing LLS’
access to the Sea, then it would convince Nepal that India no longer
wishes to hold Nepal hostage over the issues of Transit and Trade.
This would improve relations between the two countries and even
solicit Nepal’s cooperation over matters of greater importance to
India such as the security of the Himalayas.
India’s support to Nepal’s right to access the sea would work to
increase India’s ‘soft power’ over Nepal at a time when its ability to
exercise ‘hard power’ will be met with tough resistance due to the
Chinese inroads in Nepal. As a result, Nepal would be more
amenable to appreciate Indian concerns over the presence of China
and be more cooperative when India asks for safeguards.
Such a position would also make India look like a better
financial alternative to China. Despite China having much greater
economic capacity than its regional rival, China’s ‘debt trap
diplomacy’ has been a concern for countries that seek Chinese
investment. In Pakistan, the China -Pakistan Economic Corridor
has been dubbed as the new East India Company.296 This comment
is significant because despite being a close ally of China, the view
in Pakistan is that Chinese investment resembles the very
corporation that brought 200 years of British Colonialism to South
Asia. Further South, China managed to secure a 99-year lease for a
port it built in Sri Lanka as the Sri Lankan government struggled
to pay off Chinese debt, often seen as a classic example of a ‘debt
trap.’297 In this context, if India was to be able to reassure Nepal
that it supports Nepal’s right to access the sea, its investments and
involvement in Nepal and along the route to the Sea would appear
to be a much more benign and friendly endeavor. This would
assuage Nepal’s suspicions vis-à-vis India and make it appear as a
more trustworthy partner than a country that has often been
compared to a “loan shark.”
Furthermore, the international recognition of a right existing
in favor of LLS’ to the access the sea would drastically change the
dynamics of the transaction between Nepal and its neighbors. While
India could position itself as a champion of LLS’ right to access the
sea, Chinese endeavors in this regard would appear more obligatory
than charitable. This itself will have a bearing on the relations
between the two countries. It would also be in line with India’s
attempts to discourage Nepal from using Chinese ports by making
296. Syed Irfan Raza, ‘CPEC Could Become Another East India Company’,
DAWN (Oct. 18, 2016), www.dawn.com/news/1290677 [perma.cc/F2JJ-747Y].
297. Maria Abi-Habib, How China Got Srilanka to Cough Up a Port, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 25, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka
-port.html [perma.cc/AR3D-RVM2].
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the India route appear like a more feasible and profitable option.
Nepal, as a LLS, has been raising the demand for the
recognition of a Right to Access to the Sea.298 It will necessarily
support India in any endeavor to collectively raise this issue among
the international community. Nepal’s support would add weight to
India’s argument which would help India advance its interests in
making the same argument for other LLS in the continent.
2. The Case for Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a LLS that has been the center of international
attention for many decades. It is located in the junction between
Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, and also shares a
small border with the People's Republic of China. It is for this
reason that Afghanistan is considered the gateway between South
Asia and Central Asia. (See Map 1 above).
Afghanistan's unique geographical position has contributed to
its history of turbulence and violence. During much of the 19th and
20th centuries, it acted as a buffer state between the Russian
Empire and the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent. It was
the subject of 'The Great Game' between the two empires and the
center of numerous wars and armed conflicts that drained the
Afghan economy.
Before the British left India, there was no specific treaty that
regulated transit between them and Afghanistan. However, the
Treaty for the Establishment of Neighborly Relations and the
Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention, both emphasized the principle of
the freedom of transit established in the Barcelona Convention and
Statute on Freedom of Transit.299
After the Independence and Partition of India and Pakistan in
1947, Pakistan controlled the entire Southern border of
Afghanistan. This border, known as the Durand Line, was disputed
by Afghanistan, which also raised the demand of an independent
Pakhtunistan to be carved from territory within Pakistan. This
created tensions between the two neighbors and Pakistan
responded by disrupting the movement of traffic from Afghanistan
through its territory. Through the years, Pakistan would respond to
tensions with Afghanistan by routinely disrupting such movements.
For instance, in the first twenty years of Pakistan's existence, it had
shut the border with Afghanistan during 1947, 1951, 1955, and

298. See generally T. M. Franck et al., The New Poor: Landlocked,
Shelflocked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT’L.
L. & POL. 53 (1974); Landlocked and Transit Countries and Donor Countries
and International Financial and Development Institutions on Transit
Transport Cooperation, International Organization for Migration 3 (Almaty,
August 28–29, 2003).
299. Glassner, supra note 162, at 10.
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1961-1963.300 Despite a multitude of agreements signed between
the two countries, the Afghan economy till date remains vulnerable
to frequent closing and disruption of trade through its border with
Pakistan. Shoaib Ahmad Rahim notes:
The evidence reveals that such closures take place when it is peak
export time for Afghan fresh vegetables and fruits export... Afghan
officials believe that Pakistan uses security issues as pretext to
sabotage exports. On the other hand, Pakistani analysts and officials
also believe such interruptions are merely political moves. 301

Volatility on its southern border forced the Landlocked State
to seek alternate trade routes. As a result, Afghanistan established
extensive trading links with the USSR to its north, however that
route was a long and arduous one for any access to the high seas.
Afghanistan also explored the avenue of developing a route to
the Arabian Sea through its western neighbor Iran. However, for
the most part of the 20th century, transport infrastructure across
Eastern Iran remained poor and could barely cater to the
requirements of traffic emanating from Afghanistan. However,
traffic did flow through Afghanistan, and the first transit
agreement between the two countries was inked in 1962. Over the
decades, the political situation in the two countries over the decades
prevented them from being able to realize the full potential of this
route.302
China also shares a seventy-six kilometer narrow border with
Afghanistan, that runs through the extremely arduous terrain of
the Wakhan Corridor. The lack of adequate transport
infrastructure, and extreme weather conditions make the corridor
itself a difficult trade route. Additionally, it is also a very long and
unfeasible route for Afghan goods to access the sea.303
Afghanistan's economic troubles got further accentuated due
to the decades of conflict and instability on its land. Beginning with
the Soviet intervention in December 1979, Afghanistan has almost
constantly been at war and witnessed instability till date. This
ruined the economic infrastructure and disrupted economic activity.
Despite many estimates suggesting that Afghanistan has over 1
trillion USD worth of untapped natural resources,304 Afghanistan
remains among the least developed countries of the world.
300. Shoaib Rahim, Afghanistan's Dependence on Pakistan - Trade, Transit
and the Cost of Being Landlocked, 1 KARDAN J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38, 41
(2018).
301. Id. at 49.
302. Thapliyal, supra note 293.
303. Conference Report, AM. INST. AFG. STUD. & HOLLINGS CTR. INT’L
DIALOGUE
(July
24-26,
2008),
www.hollingscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/072008_Afghanistans_Other_Neighbors.pdf
[perma.cc/76BH-YZMG].
304. James Risen, U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2010) www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.ht
ml [perma.cc/AZC5-B662].
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Economic development remains key to the establishment of
securing a lasting peace in Afghanistan.
The decades of conflict also saw Pakistan increase its presence
and influence in Afghanistan. The Pakistani intelligence agencies
like the Inter Services Intelligence, had already been involved in
propping rebels against the Afghan government led by Daud Khan,
and then subsequently the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.305
However, their activities became far more potent and aggressive
once Pakistan became the vanguard for American sponsorship of
the Mujahideen against the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan. American involvement in Afghanistan ended, at least
for the time being, with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, but the
enlarged and enriched ISI continued its involvement. Afghanistan
descended into a long and bloody Civil War as the Mujahideen
splintered into various factions. Pakistan first supported the Hizb e
Islami led by Gulebuddin Hekmaktayar,306 and then after 1994
started supporting the Taliban in its conquest to take over all of
Afghanistan.307
When the United States invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan
reluctantly offered its support to the American led coalition.
Pakistani President told the Americans, “You are there to kill
terrorists, not make enemies, ‘hoping the war would be short and
limited.’”308 However, Pakistan continued to maintain links with
the Taliban leadership. When Pakistan saw the emergence of an
insurgency in the areas bordering Afghanistan as a direct fallout of
the War in Afghanistan, Pakistan responded by adopting a selective
approach towards terrorists operating out of its territory, a policy
that has often been criticized as Islamabad's "Good Taliban/ Bad
Taliban" strategy.309 Although Pakistan has often denied providing
shelter or aid to the Taliban, its leaders often end up tacitly
acknowledging this policy. Such as when former Pakistan Army
Chief, Ashfaq Kayani stated that "If you think we are going to turn
the Taliban and Haqqanis and others into mortal enemies of ours
and watch you walk out the door, you are completely crazy. Are we

305. Micheal Rubin, Opinion, Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?, WASH.
INST. (Mar. 2002), www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-isresponsible-for-the-taliban [perma.cc/9XVZ-RX6P].
306. AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND
SURVIVAL (1st ed. 2004).
307. The Afghan Taliban, STANFORD CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. AND COOP.,
www.cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban
[perma.cc/X8QP-NGZK] (last visited Jun. 24, 2020).
308. Mark Mazzetti & Ismail Khan, From the Afghan Peace Deal, a Weak
and Pliable Neighbor for Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), www.nytim
es.com/2020/03/05/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-peace.html
[perma.cc/Q94T-ZTRJ].
309. Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, Did Pakistan Win the Afghanistan War?,
DIPLOMAT (Mar. 31, 2020), www.thediplomat.com/2020/04/did-pakistan-win-th
e-afghanistan-war/ [perma.cc/HHF9-6NW8].
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hedging our bets? You bet we are."310
Although the Taliban has remained key to Islamabad's
influence over Afghanistan, Pakistan's geographical position comes
a close second. Being located on Afghanistan's southern border,
Pakistan became the most cost effective and politically viable option
for supplying the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Washington's
decades old hostility with Iran meant that the western route was
never considered. The Northern Distribution Network was
considered more expensive and politically less reliable due to the
fragile and tense nature of Russo-American relations, and was
finally closed by Moscow in 2015.311
Both the United States and Pakistan seem aware of Pakistan's
impact on the Afghan peace process. U.S. President Donald Trump
referring to American plans about withdrawing from Afghanistan
said in July 2019 that "I think Pakistan is going to help us out to
extricate ourselves"312; whereas nearly six months later the
Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi held, "The deal
will be signed in the presence of Pakistan because it was impossible
for the deal to come through without our efforts."313 It is safe to
assume that such statements are a major cause of concern in New
Delhi.
The fierce Indo-Pakistan rivalry is also present in the Afghan
conflict. While Pakistan that a regime in Kabul that is friendly to
India, would imply encirclement from New Delhi, India fears that
an Afghan government friendly to Islamabad would become a safe
haven for Pakistan sponsored anti-India terror groups. Hence, on
one hand Pakistan states that "India has no role in Afghanistan,"314
on the other India talks about a "lasting political settlement
through an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan controlled
process"315 – a thinly veiled comment on Pakistan's influence over

310. Zachary Constantino, Special Report, The India-Pakistan Rivalry in
Afghanistan,
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(Jan.
2020),
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/sr_462the_india_pakistan_rivalry_in_afghanistan.pdf [perma.cc/RXT9-X6UC].
311. Abid Amri, Opinion, Three Transit Routes for Landlocked Afghanistan,
DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Jan. 17, 2012), www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/threetransit-routes-for-landlocked-afghanistan [perma.cc/MJR5-PBSB].
312. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, US Leans Heavily On Pakistan To Secure Its
Afghan Interests, ECON. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2019, 09:23 PM), www.economict
imes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/us-leans-heavily-onpakistan-to-secure-its-afghan-interests/articleshow/70355326.cms?from=mdr
[perma.cc/N6BD-4TKT].
313. Sajjad Hussain, US-Taliban peace talks were impossible without
Pakistan: Qureshi, OUTLOOK INDIA (Feb. 22, 2020), www.outlookindia.com/newssc
roll/ustaliban-peace-talks-were-impossible-without-pakistan-qureshi/1741472
[perma.cc/UFQ2-6NC6].
314. PTI, Imran Khan Govt Says India Has No Role In Afghanistan, INDIA
TODAY (Jan. 18, 2019), www.indiatoday.in/world/story/imran-khan-govt-saysindia-has-no-role-in-afghanistan-1433506-2019-01-18 [perma.cc/5Y9A-TTG5].
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the Taliban and as a result, on the peace process. During the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India was a victim of various terror
attacks from Pakistan based anti-India terror outfits. The hijacking
of Indian Airlines Flight 814 in 1999 was a visual demonstration of
India's concerns when the terrorist hijackers found sanctuary in
Afghanistan, from where they secured the release of five terrorists
imprisoned in India in return for releasing the hostages.316 India
has been a victim of terror attacks from Pakistan sponsored proxies
since long before 9/11, and this past experience has led to India to
limit Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan as a center of its Afghan
policy.
It is because of the geographical dividend that Pakistan has
historically opposed the rights of LLS's to access the sea. During the
1950s, Afghanistan took the lead in bargaining for Rights of LLS;
where it received no support from Pakistan. It was the Pakistani
delegate, who during the meetings of the Fifth Committee said "the
Pakistani delegation explored each and every corner of
international law without discovering the right or series of rights
that the LLS claim to be endowed with."317 In the various UN
Conferences on the Laws of the Seas, the Pakistani delegation
consistently opposed the recognition of any transit rights in favor of
LLS’s that were not subject to sovereignty of Transit States and
regulated by bilateral or multilateral treaties. On the interpretation
of the relevant portions of the UNCLOS, the Pakistani delegation
declared "Another area that causes us concern is the possible
interpretation of the question of access to the sea, which we believe
is only a national right and will be governed by bilateral agreements
regarding transit."318
Despite that India echoed a position similar to Pakistan during
the Fifth Committee, it is in the strategic interest of India to
support the right of Afghanistan as a LLS to have access to the sea.
The right of LLS to access the sea directly undermines Pakistan's
geographical stranglehold on Afghanistan. Pakistan has not only
exploited the geographical circumstances to hinder any economic
development, but also for excessive interference in Afghan internal
affairs; thereby undermining their sovereignty.319 A right to access
the sea is a step towards greater autonomy for Afghanistan in the
‘Lasting Political Settlement’ To Afghanistan, PRINT (Feb. 29, 2020, 9:12 PM),
www.theprint.in/diplomacy/india-hopes-us-taliban-peace-deal-will-bringlasting-political-settlement-to-afghanistan/373476/ [perma.cc/V9BT-KFX5].
316. Manvendra Singh, Kandahar 1999: Story of a Hijacking, OPEN (Dec.
20, 2019), www.openthemagazine.com/cover-stories/kandahar-1999-story-hijac
king/ [perma.cc/F835-FW3F].
317. Uprety, supra note 29, at 64
318. Uprety, supra note 20, at 94
319. Yatharth Kachiar, Afghanistan’s Landlocked Trap, VIVEKANANDA
INT’L
FOUND.
(FEB.
8,
2019),
www.vifindia.org/article/2019/february/08/afghanistans-landlocked-trap
[perma.cc/372H-29XR].
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international arena and will be well received by the government and
the people in Afghanistan working to increase India's soft power in
the country.
India has tried to advance this cause by attempting to develop
an alternate route to Afghanistan via the Chabahar Port in Iran, in
order to fully realize the Right of Afghanistan to Access the Sea.
This has been followed by two countries' efforts to develop the
transport infrastructure to link the Iranian Port city to major cities
and provinces in Afghanistan and eventually to Uzbekistan and
Central Asia.320 The emergence of this route allows India to bypass
Pakistan in accessing Afghanistan and Central Asia and advancing
trade and development in the region. It will also reduce
Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan to access the seas and
pursue international trade and commerce. This will increase the
prospects of economic development of Afghanistan, and also give it
larger bargaining power vis-a-vis its relations with Pakistan. Kabul
will no longer be hostage to Pakistan's demographic dividend.
Economic development is also key to political stability in
Afghanistan that has been the center of conflict for almost 40 years.
With the United States on its way out, the Chabahar route has
become important to sustain the hard fought yet fragile peace in the
region. The route will allow India to play a larger and more
substantial role in the development of the Afghan economy.
Pakistan will not be able to impose its own terms. The legal
argument in favor of LLS' right to access the sea will also help India
to convince the United States of America to continue to exempt
Chabahar from the economic sanctions that have been imposed on
Iran as the relations between Washington and Tehran have been
deteriorating rapidly. This exemption was first announced in
November 2018, almost six months after the US withdrew from the
JCPOA. Asha Sawhney says that "[i]t is in the United States’ best
interest to bolster the success of Chabahar Port as a means of
responsibly reducing U.S. aid to Afghanistan in favor of regional
cooperation and increased investment. Afghanistan has no
prospects for stable security without greater avenues for economic
empowerment."321
As the United States readies to withdraw from Afghanistan
after inking an Agreement with the Taliban, the latter is set to play
a larger and more influential role in the future of Afghanistan. The
Chabahar route would not only be a means to strengthen the non-

320. Sudha Ramachandran, Iran's Chabahar Port Empowers IndiaAfghanistan Trade at Pakistan's Expense, CACI ANALYST (2018), www.cacianal
yst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13492-irans-chabahar-portempowers-india-afghanistan-trade-at-pakistans-expense.html
[perma.cc/B4L7-NQNC].
321. Asha Sawhney, Chabahar Port: Unlocking Afghanistan’s Potential, 17
NEW PERSP. FOREIGN POL’Y 48 (2019), www.csis.org/chabahar-port-unlockingafghanistans-potential [perma.cc/3TRC-P5TB].
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Taliban faction in Afghanistan but could also be a means to wean
away Pakistan's influence or control over the Taliban. Although
New Delhi sees the Taliban as a proxy for Pakistan in Afghan
affairs, a closer look may suggest otherwise. According to Zachary
Constantino their relationship "oscillates between compliance and
obstinacy."322 Taliban has time and again shown its willingness to
move away from Pakistan's clutches. During the 1990s, the Taliban
refused Pakistan's request to recognize the Durand Line as the
border between the two countries. Beginning in 2011, the Taliban
established a delegation in Qatar to conduct diplomatic negotiations
in an attempt to loosen Pakistan's grip.323 Over the years, this
delegation has only grown in size. In furtherance of the same goal,
then Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour tried to
establish links with Iran. These advances have led to the belief that
Pakistan may have connived in the drone strike that killed him in
2016.324
Other than Iran, the Taliban has also established ties with
Russia and a Taliban group also visited Moscow in 2019.
Incidentally, Iran and Russia along with India were the three
largest supporters of the Northern Alliance, the group which
resisted the expansion of Taliban control in the late 1990s.
According to Constantino, this not only forms a precedent for New
Delhi to open talks with the Taliban but also is a "tacit
acknowledgement from both powers that the Taliban may yet
prevail in the Afghan conflict."325 The Taliban has also made subtle
overtures to India, such as when it condemned Pakistan's attempts
to link the change in the autonomy of the Indian State of Jammu
and Kashmir with the Afghan Peace talks.326 Despite prodding from
the U.S., India remains non-committal to holding direct talks with
the Taliban. Should policymakers in New Delhi decide to enter into
such talks, an alternative route to Afghanistan and a recognition of
the LLS’ Right to Access the Sea would assume importance.
Pakistan would undoubtedly resist or even sabotage any attempt at
such talks, and an alternate route through Chabahar would allow
for an enhanced Indian presence that would help India engage with
the Taliban while reducing Pakistan's influence on the same.
The international recognition of the Right of LLS to Access the
Sea can act as a useful platform for India. It works to de-legitimize
322. Constantino, supra note 310.
323. How Qatar Came To Host The Taliban, BBC (Jun. 22, 2013), www
.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401 [perma.cc/8W5J-X3MM].
324. Carlotta Gall & Ruhulla Khapalwak, Taliban Leader Feared Pakistan
Before He Was Killed, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2
017/08/09/world/asia/taliban-leader-feared-pakistan-before-he-was-killed.html
[perma.cc/LR6F-2Q4C].
325. Constantino, supra note 310.
326. Maria Abi-Habib, Pakistan Runs Out of Options as India Tightens Grip
on Kashmir, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/world/as
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Pakistan's geographical leverage in Afghanistan. It also provides a
legal justification for avenues that lead to a larger role for India in
being able to contribute to a stable government in Afghanistan.
3. The Case for Mongolia
Much like Nepal, Mongolia is another Asian landlocked
country trapped between two large neighbors - China and Russia.
During the Cold War, Mongolia remained under the Soviet fold both
politically and economically. This meant that when the Soviet
economy saw its crisis in the 1980s, Mongolia also experienced
contraction.327 The end of a Cold War brought the advent of a
market economy and multiparty democracy. However, geographical
constraints meant that its economic dependence merely shifted
from one border to the other. Soviet dominance was replaced by that
of the Chinese.328
Economic dependency is further exacerbated by Mongolia's
lack of access to the sea. Naturally its two neighboring countries are
not only its largest trading partners, but Mongolia also depends on
them to have access to any other country. The nearest port is the
Chinese port of Tianjin,329 located nearly 1278 kms away from
Ulaanbaatar as the crow flies.330 In sharp contrast to Nepal, whose
two neighbors China and India are often embroiled in conflict and
competition over influence on neighbors, the increasing convergence
between Russia and China has prevented Mongolia from even being
able to play one of its neighbors against the other.331
Fears of domination have prompted Mongolia to look
elsewhere. While Mongolia has pursued friendly relations with both
its neighbors, and even initiated trilateral cooperation in the region,
Ulanbataar has also sought to break out of its geographical
constraints. These attempts have culminated in Mongolia's Third
Neighbor policy. Beginning in 1990, Mongolia sought to build strong
relations with countries other than its two neighbors.332 Formally
327. Morris Rossabi, Will Mongolia Ever Escape the Shadow of its Soviet
Past?, WORLD POL. REV. (Sep. 12, 2017), www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article
s/23121/will-mongolia-ever-escape-the-shadow-of-its-soviet-past
[perma.cc/C73C-RUV9].
328. Anudari Dashdorj, Mongolia in Regional Economic Integration:
Challenges and Opportunities (Aug. 21, 2018) (unpublished research paper,
University of Tokyo) (on file with the University of Tokyo).
329. Khalinun Nasanjargal et al., Tianjin Port-Hinterland Connectivity to
Mongolia: Challenges and Strategies, 8 DEV. COUNTRY STUD. 71, 71 (2018).
330. DISTANCE FROM ULAANBAATAR TO TIANJIN, DISTANCE CALCULATOR,
www.distancecalculator.net/from-ulaanbaatar-to-tianjin
[perma.cc/L4DP4A6T] (last visited July 5, 2020).
331. Sergey Radchenko, As China and Russia Draw Closer, Mongolia Feels
the Squeeze, ASAN F. (Oct. 11, 2018), www.theasanforum.org/as-china-andrussia-draw-closer-mongolia-feels-the-squeeze/ [perma.cc/HJ5E-2CBL].
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recognized in 2011, this policy does not talk about a specific 'Third
Neighbor' but seeks greater engagement with several of countries
in the outside world but also greater participation in international
organizations. Under this policy, Mongolia has reached out to
countries in its neighborhood like Japan and South Korea, but also
countries further away such as the United States of America.333
However, despite all its efforts, Mongolia still remains highly
susceptible to Chinese domination. Mongol trade is closely tied to
China and accounts for over ninety percent of its imports and nearly
thirty percent of its exports.334 Mongolia's landlocked status is made
worse by its poor state of transport infrastructure. In the World
Bank's Logistics Performance Index, Mongolia ranks very poorly
across the globe.335 This means that China remains the key market
for Mongolia's natural resources, as Ulanbataar finds it difficult to
export outside its immediate neighborhood.
As a part of its Third Neighbor Policy, Mongolia has sought to
increase its engagement with India. In 2009, Mongol President
Elbegdorj made his first state visit to India, and both countries
explored opportunities that were mutually beneficial. This was
followed by the visit of Elbegroj's successor, President
Khaltmaagiin Battulga, who arrived in New Delhi for a five-day
visit.336 In the interim, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had
visited Mongolia in 2015, becoming the first Indian Prime Minister.
Mongol concerns about domination by Beijing are shared by India,
which has witnessed the rapid increase in Chinese influence in its
own backyard.337 Modi's visit to Ulaanbaatar was seen as a response
to China's forays in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
Mongolia was delighted to sign a number of agreements with its
'Spiritual Neighbor'338 and saw the one billion USD line of credit
from New Delhi as a major foreign policy victory and a step towards
greater independence in foreign affairs.339
However, despite these overtures by both countries, IndoMongol relations faced obstacles. The Chinese port of Tianjin
remains the main port for trade, and the maritime distance between
333. Id.
334. MONGOLIA TRADE ON WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOLUTIONS,
www.wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/MNG
[perma.cc/ZM9S-FJR4]
(last visited June 24, 2020).
335. Prabir De & Sreya Pan, India-Mongolia Economic Relations: Current
Status and Future Prospect, 5 NORTHEAST ASIAN ECON. REV. 31 (2017).
336. Sidhant Sibal, First Time In A Decade, Mongolian President To Visit
India, WION (Sep. 16, 2019, 8:55 PM), www.wionews.com/india-news/first-timein-a-decade-mongolian-president-to-visit-india-250052 [perma.cc/799J-Z7ZB].
337. PM Narendra Modi Visits Mongolia: All You Want To Know, FIN.
EXPRESS (May 19, 2015, 8:07 AM), www.financialexpress.com/photos/businessgallery/73409/pm-narendra-modis-mongolia-visit-top-10-things-you-want-toknow/ [perma.cc/R7SH-NZWG].
338. Uradyn E. Bulag, Mongolia in 2009: From Landlocked to Land-linked
Cosmopolitan, 50 ASIAN SURV. 97 (2010).
339. Campi, supra note 332.

2021]

The Right to Access the Sea

1007

the two countries amounts to nearly 7000 kilometers. Poor
transport infrastructure means that a container from Ulaanbaatar
takes around fourty-five days to reach New Delhi.340 It is due to the
geographical constraints that Sergey Radchenko says that "the
“third neighbor” policy was a luxury conditional on China’s and
Russia’s indulgence."341
A glimpse of Chinese superintendence over Mongol foreign
policy was visible in a crisis that erupted during the winter of 2016.
Almost eighteen months after the visit of Indian Prime Minister
and the announcement of the one billion USD credit line, Mongolia
hosted the Dalai Lama in November. The Dalai Lama is widely
revered in the majority Buddhist country and his ninth visit in
Mongolia happened despite strong diplomatic protest by the
People's Republic of China. This blatant defiance of China by
Mongolia evoked a strong and swift response from Beijing. China
imposed a virtual economic blockade of Mongolia, it hiked tariffs on
trade and imposed an array of economic sanctions.342
According to the Mongol envoy to India, “With winter
temperature already around minus-twenty degrees, transport
obstruction by China is likely to create a humanitarian crisis in
Mongolia as these measures will hurt the flow of essential
commodities.”343 These were his words when he was seeking Indian
assistance in a crisis precipitated by Beijing not long after Modi's
show of strength in China's backyard. As the crisis worsened, New
Delhi failed to step up to the assistance of its 'spiritual neighbor'.
As a result, on 21st December Mongolia apologized for the visit of
the Dalai Lama and stated that the Tibetan leader would not be
invited in their country in the future.344
The crisis was a statement. It showed that despite Mongolia's
attempts to establish relations with, not just India, but several
other 'Third Neighbor' countries, the landlocked nation remained
heavily dependent on China. A legal argument in favor of
Mongolia's Right to Access the Sea would go a long way in
attempting to break Mongolia out of the constraints of its two large
neighbors. A Right of Access to the Sea would make such blockades
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a violation of international law and become a justification for
international intervention in Mongolia's backyard. It would also
allow India to recover some of its lost diplomatic goodwill after the
crisis of 2016. Eventually, it would allow Mongolia to strengthen
relations with India, and many other countries. Development of
transport infrastructure will allow Mongolia to participate and
benefit from maritime trade routes, such as the VladivostokChennai Maritime Corridor being developed by Russia and
Mongolia. These steps will help Mongolia access diplomatic and
economic opportunities outside its immediate neighborhood; and
pursue a path towards economic development and prosperity.
4. The Ends for Advocacy
India appears to benefit greatly from advocating for a greater
right for LLS to access the sea. In Afghanistan and Mongolia, it
would help India gain better influence by reducing the geographical
leverage on these States by their coastal neighbors like Pakistan
and China respectively. Whereas in Nepal, where India stares at its
own geographical equation slipping away, its support for their
access to the sea helps gain much of lost goodwill and soft power
with the country and also helps strengthen whatever geographic
dividend it already has left.

IX. CONCLUSION
LLS and their citizens have suffered enormous disadvantage
owing to the geographical handicap of which they find themselves
inheritors. However, over the years, international law has clearly
recognized this hindrance and attempted to remedy the same.
Progressively, it has worked to ensure parity in the enjoyment of
seas which are now characterized as the “common heritage of
mankind.” The right of access enunciated in Part X of the UNCLOS
is only the prevailing iteration of this philosophy and the
culmination of over two centuries of cooperation. It, therefore,
becomes important for countries – especially transit States – to
recognize their legal obligations and work to afford this right to
LLS, without preconditioning it on other strategic or diplomatic
imperatives. As such, it is also a larger international concern to
ensure the effective enforcement of this right given the significant
economic and social consequences. India’s role in ensuring the
implementation of this right is not just an important moral
obligation for the world’s largest democracy, it also makes strategic
sense for the country to undertake. Our Article attempts to provide
a roadmap for this approach.

